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ABSTRACT 
KRISTEN LACEFIELD: Mary Shelley’s Novels, the Guillotine, and Contemporary Horror 
Film 
(Under the direction of Jeanne Moskal) 
 
Assessments of Mary Shelley’s novel Frankenstein commonly refer to it as a seminal 
work of proto-science-fiction, a narrative that not only captured certain modern ideas of its 
time but also prophesied the anxieties that would emerge fully almost two centuries later in 
response to accelerating technological and scientific developments. However, despite the 
nearly ubiquitous recognition of Frankenstein’s influence on modern popular culture, there 
are few comparative studies of Shelley’s novel and its derivatives among popular modern 
films. Moreover, Frankenstein’s influence on modern film has been underestimated; that is, 
its influence extends to more cinematic genres and works than the limited examples for 
which it has been credited.  Also, scholars have largely ignored the artistic prescience and 
modern influence of Shelley’s later work of sci-fi/horror, The Last Man. In light of this 
critical deficiency, I advocate moving beyond analyses of Frankenstein’s obvious derivatives 
to study films which fuse her novels’ motifs with appeals to twentieth-century and post-
millenium audiences. I also employ the historical symbol of the guillotine—introduced in the 
late eighteenth century—as a metaphor for anxieties related to modernity and evoked in 
Shelley’s works and modern horror films. 
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Introduction: Mary Shelley, the Guillotine, and Horror Cinema 
Assessments of Mary Shelley’s novel Frankenstein commonly refer to it as a seminal 
work of proto-science-fiction, a narrative that not only captured certain modern ideas of its 
time but also prophesied the anxieties that would emerge fully almost two centuries later in 
response to accelerating technological and scientific developments. Additionally, 
Frankenstein is also widely credited as the progenitor of a set of modern fiction genres—
tech-horror and the mad-scientist narrative, for example—tremendously popular in literature 
and media today.  
 However, despite the nearly ubiquitous recognition of Frankenstein’s influence on 
modern popular culture, there are few comparative studies of Shelley’s novel and its 
derivatives among popular modern films (for instance, James Whale’s film and the numerous 
later adaptations of the novel).  Moreover, Frankenstein’s influence on modern film has been 
underestimated; that is, its influence extends to more cinematic genres and works than the 
limited examples for which it has been credited.  In light of this critical deficiency, I advocate 
moving beyond analyses of Frankenstein’s obvious derivatives to study films which fuse her 
novel’s motifs with appeals to twentieth-century and post-millenium audiences.  These films 
belong to several popular genres including bio-horror, tech-horror, reproductive horror, 
apocalyptic sci-fi, and the zombie film; some prominent examples are Invasion of the Body 
Snatchers (1956), The Fly (1958), Night of the Living Dead (1968)—all of which inspired 
numerous sequels and remakes—and the more recent 28 Days Later (2002), Dawn of the 
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Dead (2004), I Am Legend (2007), The Human Centipede (2010), Rise of the Planet of the 
Apes (2011), and the just-released zombie film World War Z (2013), as well as the popular 
television series The Walking Dead (2010-2013).  All of these films emphasize the particular 
anxieties explored in Frankenstein and employ similar themes and motifs.  
 In considering the legacy of Frankenstein, it is important to examine the mythology 
surrounding its creation—a mythology fostered by Shelley in her 1831 introduction to the 
novel, first published in 1818, wherein she discusses the conditions under which she 
conceived it. Especially famous is her colorful anecdote concerning the informal writing 
contest of 1816 among herself, Percy Shelley, Lord Byron, and John Polidori. At one point 
that summer, she writes, Byron initiated this competition, a challenge that frustrated her for 
days: “I thought and pondered—vainly.  I felt that blank incapability of invention which is 
the greatest misery of authorship, when dull Nothing replies to our anxious invocations. 
‘Have you thought of a story?’ I was asked each morning, and each morning I was forced to 
reply with a mortifying negative.”1  Yet she asserts that creative inspiration finally arrived in 
a nightmare about a frightening creature produced through artificial means.2   
Scholarship has tended to take Mary Shelley at her word about the novel’s origins in 
a contest and a nightmare. Frankenstein is thus often understood as the result of a fortuitous 
spark that generated a mysterious creative outflowing from deep within the writer’s psyche. 
Instead, my analysis emphasizes the historical context that produced Shelley’s narrative, 
specifically the constitutive influence of three particular historical developments of the 
                                                 
1 Mary Shelley, “Introduction” to 1831 edition, in Frankenstein; or The Modern Prometheus, 
vol. 1 of The Novels and Selected Works of Mary Shelley, ed. by Nora Crook (London: 
Pickering and Chatto, 1996), p. 186. 
 
2 Ibid. 
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Romantic period:  (1.) the violence of the French Revolution, especially the Terror and the 
ten years preceeding Napoleon’s 1799 ascendancy; (2.) the intrusion of modern technology 
into life and death processes like execution and childbirth, especially the introduction of 
guillotine execution and the concomitant rise of modern obstetrics in the late eighteeenth 
century; (3.) and the emergence of materialist theories in science and medicine, which 
inspired various sensationalized experiments such as those performed on the corpses of the 
guillotined.  
Due to the guillotine’s significance as a symbol for all three historical 
developments—the French Revolution, the emergence of modern technology, and the rise of 
materialist science—I employ it in my analysis as a metaphorical paradigm for interpreting 
the Frankenstein narrative. The guillotine was a powerful signifier in the British Romantic 
imagination because of its status as both a symbol and a symptom of the period’s historical 
anxieties. Chapter One of this dissertation provides a brief history of the guillotine and 
assesses its significance in popular British attitudes of the Romantic Period, examining in 
particular the guillotine’s function as symbol and symptom of its historical context.  
The guillotine’s relevance for Frankenstein is a primary component of Chapter Two, 
which argues that the character of Victor Frankenstein is a narrative displacement of 
Giovanni Aldini, widely perceived at the time as the prototypical “mad-scientist” due to his 
notorious experiments, which used guillotined corpses to test the materialist scientific 
theories of his uncle, Luigi Galvani. According to Mary Shelley’s introduction to 
Frankenstein, during the summer of 1816 Percy and Byron often pondered the possibility 
that “perhaps a corpse would be reanimated; galvanism had given token of such things: 
perhaps the component part of a creature might be manufactured, brought together, and 
  
4
endued with vital warmth.”3   The theory’s originator, Galvani, was a physicist and physician 
famous throughout Europe for his experiments in what he termed animal electricity, the 
theory that electricity activates the nervous system in animals and humans. 
Scholars’ long acceptance of the ghost-story myth, rather than of the guillotine as the 
defining context for Frankenstein, has led to a distorted assessment of Shelley’s novel. 
Scholars often acknowledge Galvani as an important source for Frankenstein but neglect to 
credit his nephew and successor Giovanni Aldini, whose notoriety was tied to the guillotine 
and who was better known to the British public than his uncle, in part because he was fluent 
in English and French. Aldini travelled throughout Europe conducting sensationalistic public 
experiments on executed corpses—for instance, at the London execution of the notorious 
murderer George Foster at Newgate in 1803—experiments that were covered in British 
newspapers along with their underlying theory, galvanism. 4 Aldini first achieved notoriety 
during the French Revolution for frequenting guillotine executions and conducting 
experiments on the severed heads of the condemned,  “testing” the heads post-execution for 
facial expressions and other signs of residual life and then re-animating them with electricity.  
Like Victor Frankenstein’s use of corpses for scientific research in Mary Shelley’s novel, 
Aldini searched for the key to life in his experiments on corpses.  In fact, guillotine execution 
attained a distinctive mystique in the popular Romantic imagination partly due to Aldini’s 
famous experiments. 
  Aldini preferred to utilize corpses who had suffered guillotine execution because of 
its mechanized precision: there was a clarity to the guillotine in that it reduced the act of 
                                                 
3 Ibid., p. 43. 
 
4 Peter Gay, Enlightenment: The Science of Freedom (New York: Norton, 1996).  
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execution to a single moment, a sudden shift from life to death.5  Rather than a more 
extended process in which the instant of death was difficult to discern (as with a hanging, for 
example), the guillotine presented death as a distinct, mechanized switch-point from 
animation to lifelessness.  This aspect of guillotine execution accorded with galvanism’s 
notion that life might be generated or halted abruptly with the application or withdrawal of a 
single electrical charge.  Conversely, popular reports of severed heads exhibiting expressions 
post-guillotining implied that some residual force or “charge” might exist for a time after the 
execution. For Aldini, guillotine execution reinforced galvanic notions about life and death 
processes.  His experiments with guillotined corpses supported a materialist view of 
existence, according to which life is merely the animation of biological material by 
exclusively physical—rather than spiritual—processes.  
Victor Frankenstein the corpse-stealer, like Aldini,  was an eccentric scientist 
callously using the dead in his attempt to regenerate life through the application of electrical 
charges.  And while Shelley’s novel does not specify how Victor’s “subjects” originally died, 
her first readers would have recognized connection between executions and scientific 
experimentation on corpses.  They were connected not only because of Aldini famous 
experiments but also due to the so-called Murder Act of 1751, a controversial prohibition on 
burying criminals executed for murder that stipulated that their corpses be used for 
dissection.6   
By recognizing Aldini’s role in Frankenstein, we can see more clearly how Shelley’s 
novel activates associations with the guillotine specifically, not just with the widely 
                                                 
5 Gay, Science of Freedom, pp. 30-52.  
 
6 Mark Canuel, The Shadow of Death: Literature, Romanticism, and the Subject of 
Punishment (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2007), p. 35. 
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acknowledged context of the French Revolution: Frankenstein evinces the very anxieties and 
tensions symbolized by the guillotine. I argue that viewing Victor as a displacement of Aldini 
allows for a reading of Frankenstein with reference to the guillotine and offers interesting 
new ways of interpreting Shelley’s novel.  
 
The Guillotine as Historical Symptom and Modern Symbol 
 Since its invention in 1791 in the first years of the French Revolution, the guillotine 
has evoked multiplex responses, functioning as a kind of Rorschach test for various anxieties 
about modernity, with its sometimes-frightening technological and political developments.  
The guillotine symbolized such Englightenment trends. For instance, in A Tale of Two Cities, 
Charles Dickens writes:   
It was the best cure for headache, it infallibly prevented the hair from turning grey, it 
imparted a particular delicacy to the complexion, it was the National Razor which 
shaved close: who kissed La Guillotine, looked through the little window and sneezed 
into the sack. It was the sign of the regeneration of the human race. It superseded the 
Cross. Models of it were worn on breasts from which the Cross was discarded, and it 
was bowed down to and believed in where the Cross was denied. 7  
For Dickens, the guillotine symbolizes the atheism of the French Revolution that dismissed 
Catholicism in favor of egalitarian Enlightenment humanism.  The guillotine initially seemed 
to exemplify these ideals, and, as Dickens notes, enjoyed an almost mythical status among 
French revolutionaries as the signifier par excellance of a liberated modernity.  And yet, as 
Dickens indicates, the guillotine’s meanings reversed those of the crucifixion. Whereas the 
                                                 
7 Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities, 1st Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 
p. 332.  
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Cross transformed from a signifier of death to a symbol of spiritual transcendence, the 
guillotine devolved into a metaphor for the horrors of totalitarianism.  
 Over a century later, Dickens’ fellow novelist Albert Camus articulated the horror 
mechanization engendered by modern revolution and crystallized in guillotine execution: “I 
was struck by this picture because the guillotine looked like such a precision instrument, 
perfect and gleaming. I was made to see that contrary to what I thought, it was very simple. 
The machine destroyed everything: you were killed discreetly, with a little shame and with 
great precision.” 8  Here, the narrator’s initially positive appraisal is rendered darkly ironic in 
the following sentence with the blunt declaration that “the machine destroys everything.” 
Camus’s equation of resplendent technological precision with totalizing destruction points to 
one of the enduring central paradoxes of the French Revolution and of modernity itself.  
Michel Foucault viewed the Enlightenment as an attempt to regulate and instrumentalize 
“natural” impulses, forcing human drives and behaviors to operate within the confines of a 
“disciplinary society.”9 Similarly, Max Horkheimer and Theodore Adorno identified in 
modernity a perversion of human society into something reductively mechanized and 
materialist.10  
Furthermore, the guillotine emphasized more ontological questions.  Its designers 
regarded the replacement of the human executioner by a machine as a humane improvement, 
but insomuch as this depersonalization focused on the act of death itself, a distinct moment of 
                                                 
8 Albert Camus, The Stranger, 3rd Edition (New York: Vintage International, 1989), p. 102.  
 
9 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage, 
1975), p. 105.  
 
10 Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2007).  
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termination via the severing of head and body.  Yet paradoxically, strange facial expressions 
and contortions often appeared on the severed heads after decapitation, implying the possible 
continuation of consciousness and provoking a sense of ontological 
indeterminacy.11  Furthermore, the image of a severed head not only questioned where life 
ended and where it began, but also pointed to the disagreement between Cartesian and 
materialist paradigms of identity.  According to the Cartesian model, the locus of identity is 
the mind distinct from the material body.  This concept of a mind/body split also accords 
with traditional religious notions of identity as primarily spiritual rather than physical.  
Opposing this distinction between the mind and the body, modern materialism conversely 
understands the “mind” as a purely physical phenomenon (the brain) and refuses to relegate 
the body to an ontologically inferior category as Cartesian and traditional Christian 
perspectives do.  This fundamental disagreement about human subjectivity is the source of 
the contradictions expressed by Slavoj !i"ek when he writes, “The guillotine, this image of 
uncontrollable Otherness with which no identification seems possible, is nothing but the 
objective correlate of the abstract negativity that defines the subject.” 12  The guillotine thus 
embodies a set of ontological paradoxes generated by the modernity.    
 Given that the guillotine can be read as symtom and signifier of modern historical 
anxieties, I intend to employ it as a kind of clue signalling a labyrinth of meanings embedded 
in Romantic literature and certain modern films. I also want to analyze the significance of the 
                                                 
11 Whether these expressions demonstrated actual consciousness or merely the odd automatic 
contortions of a dying nervous system was a difficult question to answer, yet witnesses often 
attributed emotions to the dying victims' faces, but these might have been mere fantasies by 
the observers rather than actual occurrences. 
 
12 Slavoj !i"ek, For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor (New 
York: Verso, 2008), p. 90. 
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slice itself—the uneasy, indeterminate line that simultaneously separates and joins 
ontological categories such as life/death, mind/body, spirit/matter, and nature/technology.   
This hitherto understudied aspect of guillotine lore—the slice—is a  have neglected the 
particular significance of the slice as a distinctively useful metaphor for uncomfortable 
juxtapositions and indeterminacies of modernity, providing new ways of interpreting 
Romantic texts such as Frankenstein and countering conventional assumptions about 
Romantic organicism. That is, using the guillotine slice as an interpretive paradigm will help 
us to identify juxtapositions in Romantic texts and recognize a kind of asyndeton as a key 
constitutive feature of Romanticism itself. 
 
The Slice Metaphor, Historical Anxiety, and Modern Paradox in Frankenstein and The 
Last Man 
In Chapters Three and Four, I focus on the metaphor of the slice in analyzing the 
tensions within ontological binaries of life/death, mind/body, spirit/matter, nature/tech that I 
argue underlie Mary Shelley’s science fiction novels Frankenstein and The Last Man, her 
lesser-known apocalyptic novel. These works emphasize ontological categories contested by 
modernity, exploring modernity’s simultaneous blurring and sharpening of the theoretical 
slices that simultaneously separate and join oppositional categories. Shelley’s novels merge 
categories of life and death through repeated descriptions of their protagonists as barely alive 
or death-like, but they also frequently emphasize the sharp discordance between life and 
death. We see this paradox in the Frankenstein narrative, which classifies the Creature as 
alive but inhuman and repeatedly describes Victor in terms suggestive of death. In the same 
way, The Last Man’s hero, Lionel Verney, the witness of a worldwide plague who constantly 
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anticipates his own imminent death, often perceives himself as existing uncomfortably 
between existential states, with the specter of death intruding uncomfortably into life. We can 
also see this paradox functioning in John Polidori’s The Vampyre, which, with its invention 
of the undead aristocrat, originated the now ubitquitous vampire of modern cinema as an 
elegant figure who preyes on the living and gains eternal life through the death of his victims. 
This descriptive collapsing of the line between existence and death suggests the same 
preoccupation with boundaries underlying popular discussions of the guillotine in the 
Romantic period—in which the sharp juxtapositions or slices of guillotine execution were 
symbolically symptomatic of unresolved paradoxes inherent in modern ontological 
categories.  
More than any of Mary Shelley’s subsequent works, her apocalyptic novel The Last 
Man expands on many of the ontological anxieties underlying Frankenstein. Like Shelley’s 
earlier “modern” novel, The Last Man articulates an anxiety about the tension between 
antonymic categories life/death, spirit/matter, mind/body, and nature/technology—or 
nature/civilization, to put it another way.  This last binary is often expressed in fiction and 
film as an apocalyptic narrative, one in which civilization disintegrates and humanity nears 
extinction. As apocalypse is a prominent topic in a number of twentieth-century and post-
millenium films, I contend that the thematic influence of The Last Man has been 
underestimated and that its evocation of ontological anxieties and apocalyptic themes make 
it—like Frankenstein—a kind of literary ancestor to a number of later science fiction and 
horror films.  For this reason, I argue that The Last Man deserves greater critical attention. 
In Chapters Five and Six, I turn to some popular cinematic descendents of Shelley’s 
novels, moving beyond a consideration of only those films explicitly named after 
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Frankenstein. My analysis focuses on Frankenstein’s wider, unnamed influence on films 
recognizably symptomatic of the same modern anxieties that produced her classic narrative. 
For example, one of the basic conventions of the modern zombie genre—including the first 
and best-known zombie film, George Romero’s Night of the Living Dead—is that killing a 
zombie requires inflicting a fatal injury to its head.13 Modern scholarship on zombie films 
commonly notes the ubiquity of this imperative to destroy the zombie brain (rather than, say, 
the heart).14 Significantly, this convention confines the locus of existence to the head and 
suggests a categorical and existential split between the head (or mind) and the body. In 
utilizing this motif of the slice, zombie films draw more deeply upon the same kinds of 
anxieties elicited by guillotine execution—the sense that existence is localized in the mind 
and, moreover, that the mind is somehow categorically and existentially distinct from the 
body. In their exploration of such ontological anxieties, zombie films like Night of the Living 
Dead and 28 Days Later echo thematic preoccupations of Frankenstein and The Last Man. 
Moreover, zombie films lack much suggestion of any non-material, spiritual existence, 
implying the materialist view that identity and behavior are entirely biologically determined.  
In addition to the zombie genre, I also examine two groundbreaking science-fiction 
films of the 1950s, Invasion of the Body Snatchers and The Fly, as well as notable subsequent 
remakes and films inspired by the original classic films.   
  
                                                 
13 George Romero, Night of the Living Dead (1968; Los Angeles, CA: Image Ten), DVD: 
2001.  
 
14 See Deborah Christie and Sarah Juliet Lauro, Better Off Dead: The Evolution of the 
Zombie as Post-Human (New York: Fordham University Press, 2011); William Bishop, 
American Zombie Gothic: The Rise and Fall (And Rise) of the Walking Dead in Popular 
Culture (New York: McFarland, 2010); and Stephanie Boluk, Generation Zombie: Essays on 
the Living Dead in Modern Culture (New York: Routledge, 2011).  
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Chapter Two 
“Head after head, and never heads enough”: Perceptions of Revolutionary Violence and 
the Guillotine in the British Romantic Psyche 
In its investigation of Romanticism’s engagement with the early years of the French 
Revolution (the period of time from the fall of the Bastille in 1789 to Napoleon’s ascendancy 
in 1799), literary scholarship has tended until recently, and to some extent even still, to treat 
the Romantics’ experience of the Revolution as immediate, as a single moment of sublime 
horror rather than as a profoundly mediated, local process of reception, apprehension, and 
negotiation.  
Indeed, this is a valid critique of Ronald Paulson’s otherwise immensely useful 
Representations of Revolution.1 In Paulson’s work as well as in that of Mary Jacobus, Julie 
Carlson, and Terrence Hoagwood (among others), the underlying assumption is that the 
Revolutionary experience was, for the most part, unmediated—that the Romantics somehow 
possessed direct, comprehensive knowledge of the events in France, that their knowledge of 
the Revolution was undifferentiated, and that their nightmare visions of its violence and 
action were prompted by some direct view of its spectacle.2  However, the ideal of 
unmediated apprehension is not even true for most of the events described in accounts such 
as those of Helen Maria Williams and Mary Wollstonecraft, although it is also probably the 
                                                 
1 Ronald Paulsen, Reflections of Revolution (New York: Norton, 1994).  
 
2 Terrence Hoagwood, Politics, Philosophy, and the Production of Romantic Texts (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1996).  
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case that a sense of an unmediated experience is what these writers were consciously 
attempting in their reports.  
 Against the scholarly consensus described above, Jeremy Popkin, for one, asserts that 
the lived experience of the French Revolution was profoundly mediated.1  He reminds us that 
the vast majority of the Revolution’s spectators and even its actors experienced the 
Revolution not in person but through an enormous, growing system of journalistic 
transmission that originated with the Revolution and that changed the conditions of political 
discourse.  In essence, journalism did not simply convey the news from France but it also 
shaped events there (and certainly the British response) and it was in the rapid establishment 
of the proto-modern-news cycle that we find a kind of anxiety-producing dissemination of 
daily news. The London Times provides an interesting example of the new journalism’s 
influence on popular understandings of events in France. The Times was established only in 
1785, but by the summer of 1794, it held the position of a respected and popular source of 
continental news.  This status was the result its unusual network of correspondence and 
transmission. The French Revolution profoundly increased the interest in and the demand for 
fast, frequent coverage of news events.  For the entirety of the Revolution, the Times was 
unusual in its early and consistent devotion to such coverage, and its authority rested in its 
exceptional speed.2  In one article, for instance, the paper noted, “The Messenger who 
                                                 
1 Jeremy Popkin, A Short History of the French Revolution (New York: NYU Press, 2009).  
 
2 Ian McCalman, An Oxford Companion to the Romantic Age (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001).  
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brought the dispatches yesterday from France made the quickest journey ever known, having 
come from Paris is 38 hours.”3 
By 1794, the Times possessed a network of correspondents in France and had 
developed various routes and couriers for timely transmission.  Reports from Paris to London 
arrived three times per week, with an average transmission time of eight or nine days, and 
consequently the paper offered frequent updates on events in Paris several times a week, 
sometimes offering several pages of information on the Revolution per issue.4 The relative 
superiority of its coverage gave the Times considerable power to shape the British experience 
of the events in France.  The paper could also influence the order and timing with which its 
audience learned of revolutionary events.  Yet this influence inevitably created distortions in 
the British understanding of such events; one of the most significant distortions was a 
recurrent sense of acceleration and compression.    For instance, in January 1973, during the 
trial and execution of Louis XVI, the paper increased its speed and frequency to the point 
that it provided a hourly breakdown of events.5  This dynamic had the effect of adding to the 
dramatic effect and immediacy of the news from France. Such practices could also magnify 
shock and confusion, contributing to the dramatic emotional response of many Britons to 
events both positive and negative. This style of news delivery heightened the contrasts and 
discordances of the Revolution, reinforcing Britons’ tendency to experience it as a series of 
extreme events and seismic shifts.  Even the often-shocking literary conceptualizations of the 
September Massacres and the Terror pale in comparison to the sensational, frequently 
                                                 
3 Qtd. in Ronald Paulsen, Reflections of the Revolution, p. 32.  
 
4 Ibid. 
 
5 Ibid. 
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fabricated accounts provided in The Times and other periodicals, which in numerous 
instances resembled what William Cobbett described as “dark catalogue[s]” of atrocity.6  The 
journalism there deepened its audience’s sense of cognitive dissonance. Moreover, the 
journalism’s tone—dramatic, emotional, and often exploitive—demonstrates that its goal was 
not objectivity but sensationalism.  In particular, anti-Jacobinism proliferated, as exemplified 
in this September 11, 1792 passage from the Times: 
The Countess de Chevre, with her five children, the oldest not eleven years of age, 
were massacred at her house, Rue de Bacq, on the 3rd, and their bodies exposed 
before the door.  The children were first assassinated before the eyes of the parent.  
She bore this infernal sight with a fortitude almost supernatural; she embraced the 
bleeding head of the youngest, and met her fate with heroic contempt.  The wretches 
first cut off the arms that sustained her last sad comfort, and then severed her head 
from her body.7   
As we see in the report above, British newspaper reports tended to highlight and often 
exaggerate graphic depictions of Jacobin cruelties while at the same time emphasizing the 
admirable fortitude and bearing of the persecuted nobility.  
Like the Times, other journalistic forms offered an anti-Jacobin view.  Pamphlets, 
tracts, cartoons, and etchings enjoyed tremendous popularity during the period.  A collection 
of scholarly essays, Reflections of Revolution: Images of Romanticism, addresses the 
                                                 
6 Qtd. in Matthew Buckley’s Tragedy Walks the Streets: The French Revolution in the 
Making of Modern Drama (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), p. 72.  
 
7 Ibid., p. 78.  
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representation of revolutionary violence in the popular arts.8  For example, the grotesque 
cartoons of James Gillray illuminate the public’s strong opinions about the events in France. 
One of Gillray’s most famous etchings, Un petit Souper a la Parisienne – or – a Family of 
Sans Culotts refreshing after the fatigues of the day, depicts a radical French family engaging 
in cannibalism at the dining room table.9  (The widespread rumors of French cannibalism are 
taken up by Angus Easson, who examines the impact of such rumors on extreme responses to 
the Revolution in British culture and literature.) The horrific associations of the French 
Revolution with dismemberment did not always take the extreme form of characterizing the 
French as cannibals but instead often employed a slightly less shocking form—an emphasis 
on dismemberment by guillotine. 
In her multi-volume Letters Written from France during the years 1790-1796, 
Williams describes a number of guillotine executions.  The following excerpts especially 
demonstrate Williams’s approach to her descriptions and are instructive for understanding 
the way that those writing home tended to relate bloody executions.  This passage describes 
the execution of Charlotte Corday: 
It is difficult to conceive the kind of heroism which she displayed in the way to the 
execution.  The women who were called furies of the guillotine, and who had 
assembled to insult her on leaving the prison, were awed into silence by her 
demeanor, while some of the spectators uncovered their heads before her, and others 
gave loud tokens of applause.  There was such an air of chastened exultation thrown 
over her countenance, that she inspired sentiments of love rather than sensations of 
                                                 
8 A. Yarrington, Reflections of Revolution: Images of Romanticism (New York: Routledge, 
1993).  
 
9 Gillray produced this etching in 1792.  
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pity.  She ascended the scaffold with undaunted firmness, and, knowing that she had 
only to die, resolved to die with dignity. She had learned from her jailor the mode of 
punishment, but was not instructed in the detail; and when the executioner decided to 
tie her feet to the plank, she resisted, from an apprehension that he had been ordered 
to insult her; but on his explaining himself she submitted with a smile.  When he took 
off the handkerchief, the moment before she bent under the fatal stroke, she blushed 
deeply; and her head, which was held up to the multitude the moment 
after…exhibited this last impression of offended modesty.10 
This description of Corday’s expression post-guillotine became a popular, widely 
proliferated anecdote in both France and Britain.  This anecdote is significant because it 
reinforced the fear that the consciousness of the executed might continue post-decapitation; 
moreover, this anecdote generated increased fascination with guillotine execution in the 
British public. In another passage, Williams deepens this sense of horror and fascination 
surrounding the guillotine with a vivid description of a distraught Marie Antoinette: 
Marie Antoinette had preserved an uniform behavior during the whole of her trial, 
and except when a starting tear accompanied her answer to [to interrogation].  She 
was condemned about four in the morning, and heard her sentence with composure.  
But her firmness forsook her in the way from the court to her dungeon—she burst 
into tears; when, as if ashamed of this weakness, she observed to her guards, that 
though she wept at that moment, they should see her go to the scaffold without 
shedding a tear. In her way to execution, where she was taken after the accustomed 
manner in a cart, with her hands tied behind her, she paid little attention to the priest 
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who attended her, and still less to the surrounding multitude.  Her eyes, though bent 
on vacancy, did not conceal the emotion that was laboring at her heart—her cheeks 
were sometimes in a singular manner streaked with red, and sometimes overpowered 
with deadly paleness; but her general look was that of indignant sorrow. She reached 
the place of execution about noon, and when she turned her eyes toward the gardens 
and the palace, she became visibly agitated.  She ascended the scaffold with 
precipitation, and her head was in a moment held up to the people by the 
executioner.11 
Williams also provides another interesting execution commentary in her description and 
interpretation of Louis XVI’s execution. 
The calmness which Lewis the sixteenth displayed on this great trial of human 
fortitude, is attributed not only to the support his mind received from religious faith, 
but also to the hope which it is said he cherished, even till his last moment, that the 
people, whom he meant to address from the scaffold, would demand that his life 
might be spared. And his confessor, from motives of compassion, had encouraged 
him in this hope.  After ascending the scaffold with a firm step, twice the unhappy 
monarch attempted to speak, and twice Santerre prevented him from being heard by 
ordering the drums to be beat immediately. Alas, had he been permitted to speak, 
poor was his chance of exciting commiseration! Those who pitied his calamities had 
carefully shunned that fateful spot, and those who most immediately surrounded him 
only wait till the stroke was given, in order to dip their pikes and their handkerchiefs 
in his blood…Two persons who were on that scaffold assert, that the unhappy 
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monarch, finding the hope he had cherished of awakening the compassion of the 
people, frustrated by the impossibility of his being heard, as a last resource, declared 
that he had secrets to reveal …Then it was that despair seized upon the mind of the 
unfortunate monarch—his countenance assumed a look of horror—twice with agony 
he repeated, “I am undone! I am undone!” His confessor meanwhile called to him 
from the foot of the scaffold…and in one moment he was delivered from the evils of 
mortality. The executioner held up the bleeding head, and the guards cried, “Vive le 
Republique!” Some dipped their handkerchiefs in the blood—but the greater 
number—chilled with horror at what had passed, desired the commander would lead 
them instantly from the spot. The hair was sold in separate tresses at the foot of the 
scaffold; and, as if every incident of this tragedy had been intended to display the 
strange vicissitudes of human fortune, as if every scene were meant “to point a 
moral,” the body was conveyed in a cart to the parish church.12 
Such vivid descriptions of the French monarchs’ demeanor and behavior at their executions 
further reinforced the public’s fascination with the guillotine, giving it a heightened symbolic 
cultural currency in both France and Britain.  Moreover, such sympathetic accounts echoed 
those such as Edmund Burke in generating some sense of emotional repugnance to the 
violent revolutionary events in France.  
Wollstonecraft also recorded a number of observations about the guillotine executions 
of revolutionary France. In Book 3, Chapter 1 of Wollstonecraft’s The French Revolution, 
following her account of the Bastille’s fall, she stops to consider whether the Revolution was 
worth all the excesses of the Terror. If the National Assembly had “been allowed quietly to 
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have made some reforms, paving the way for more, the Bastille, though tottering on its 
dungeons, might yet have stood erect.  And, if it had, the sum of human misery could 
scarcely have been increased.”13 One way to interpret this passage, according to Stephen 
Blakemore, is to see that Wollstonecraft is equating the violence of the ancient regime and 
with that of the Terror.14  That is, the revolutionary government has simply traded one form 
of fear and oppression for another.  
For the guillotine not finding its way to the splendid square it has polluted, streams of 
innocent blood would not have flowed, to obliterate the remembrance of false 
imprisonment, and drown the groans of solitary grief in the loud cry of agony—when, 
the thread of life quickly cut in twain, the quivering light of hope is instantly dashed 
out—and the billows suddenly closing, the silence of death is felt!  This tale is soon 
told.15  
The passage reflects her ambivalence, in which she seems unclear as to whether the Bastille’s 
fall was worth the guillotine’s blood.  The “innocent blood” of the victims of the guillotine 
balances against the remembrance of the Bastille’s victims, a remembrance that is obliterated 
or washed away by the guillotine’s blood, since one cancels out the other.  It is almost as if 
this blood is expiatory.  But it is also as if the Revolution’s “stains”—the blood, the 
guillotines, and the Terror escape and flow from the Bastille’s “opening.” 
 There are other ambivalences and dichotomies in Wollstonecraft’s report.  The 
contrast between public executions and the secret imprisonments—the blood drowning the 
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“groans of solitary grief in the loud cry of agony” insinuates a distinction between 
imprisoned life and Revolutionary death.  Wollstonecraft emphasizes this contrast by closing 
the sentence with the sharp finality of death and the drowning “billows” that return us to the 
imagery of “innocent blood” drowning the groans of the Bastille’s prisoners. The 
juxtaposition of the terms “innocent” and “blood” draw attention to the distinct sense of 
paradox inherent in revolutionary violence.  
In France before the guillotine, executioners performed beheadings with a sword or 
axe.  Sometimes it took repeated blows to completely sever the head, and it was very likely 
for the condemned to slowly bleed to death from their wounds before the head could be 
severed. The family of the victim or the victim himself would sometimes pay the executioner 
to ensure that the blade was sharp in order for a quick and relatively painless death.  Hanging 
was another common type of execution, a form of death that could take minutes or longer. 
Other more gruesome methods of executions were also used, such as the wheel or burning at 
the stake. Opposition to these punishments was slowly growing, due mainly to the ideas and 
philosophies of the Enlightenment thinkers—philosophers such as Voltaire and Locke—who 
argued for humanitarian methods of execution.16 
Scholar Regina Janes notes a further significance of the invention of the guillotine.17  
Traditional beheadings carried out by ax or sword (in which severed heads were placed on 
pikes) represented the violence of the mob, but, to the leaders of the revolution, the guillotine 
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was “the technological perfection of impersonal violence.” The guillotine also had a 
humanitarian justification: 
When Guillotine presented the projected reforms in the criminal code to the 
assembly, he proposed at the same time “un simple mecanisme” to effect the 
decapitations.  With his death delivered to him more efficiently, the victim would 
struggle less and endure less agony.  Such a machine would enable the state to kill 
citizens without hurting them.  The condemned were spared pain to their bodies, the 
executioners pain to their sensibilities…With a decapitating machine, the monopoly 
of violence would be restored to the state, re-institutionalized, and immobilized.18    
Despite its modernity and its egalitarian, humanitarian purposes, the guillotine ironically 
came to symbolize the bloodthirsty mob because its efficiency made possible executions on a 
massive scale. 
 Almost immediately after the French Revolution commenced, its leaders initiated a 
drastic revision of the legal system, including the penal code. Dr. Joseph Ignace Guillotine on 
October 10th, 1789, proposed six articles to the new Legislative Assembly.19  Guillotine was 
a well-regarded professor of anatomy.  One contributing factor to his reputation was his 
previous work, under King Louis XVI, investigating Anton Mesmer.  A German physician 
living in Paris, Mesmer theorized that a natural energetic transference, known as magnétisme 
animal, occurred between all animated and inanimate objects; moreover, Mesmer claimed 
that he could control this force. Mesmerism was a type of vitalism that emphasized the 
movement of life energy through distinct channels in the body.   Guillotine’s commission 
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concluded that Mesmer’s claims were fraudulent.  Guillotine’s involvement in the Mesmer 
controversy demonstrates an historical connection between the guillotine and materialist 
theories such as such as vitalism. 
 In the revolutionary setting, Guillotine called for decapitation to become the sole 
method of execution in France, be carried out by a simple machine, and to involve no torture. 
Guillotine presented an etching of one possible device, resembling an ornate but hollow stone 
column with a falling blade, operated by an effete executioner cutting the suspension rope.20 
The machine was also to be hidden from the view of large crowds, to accord with Guillotine's 
view that execution should be private and dignified.   (Guillotine’s view of execution was 
consonant with modern views.) Five other reforms were proposed: one asked for a 
nationwide standardization in punishment, while others concerned the treatment of the 
criminal's family, who were not to be harmed or discredited; property, which was not to be 
confiscated; and corpses, which were to be returned to the families. On December 1st, 1789, 
the assembly accepted five recommendations, but the beheading machine was rejected. 
However, in 1791 the National Assembly sought a new method for  all condemned people, 
regardless of class. Proponents believed that capital punishment's purpose was the ending of 
life instead of the infliction of pain.  A committee was formed under Antoine Louis, 
physician to the King and Secretary of the Academy of Surgery, and Dr. Guillotine.  It is 
from the latter’s name that the guillotine derived its name.  For a while, it was facetiously 
called “Mdlle. Guillotine” or “Guillotine’s daughter.” 
The group developing the guillotine for the National Assembly was influenced by 
earlier execution devices such as the Scottish Maiden and the Halifax Gibbet. While these 
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prior instruments usually crushed the neck or used blunt force to take off a head, the 
committee’s device used a crescent blade and a lunette (a hinged two part yoke to immobilize 
the victim's neck). Later, this design for a quick, painless, decapitation machine was given to 
Tobias Schmidt, a German engineer, who then built the first guillotine and tested it, initially 
on animals, but later on human corpses. It comprised two fourteen-foot uprights joined by a 
crossbar, whose internal edges were grooved and greased with tallow; the weighted blade 
was either straight or curved like an axe. The system was operated via a rope and pulley, 
while the whole construction was mounted on a high platform.  The final testing took place at 
a hospital, where three carefully chosen corpses—those of strong, stocky men—were 
successfully beheaded. The first execution took place on April 25th, 1792, when a 
highwayman called Nicholas-Jacques Pelletier was killed. After an independent report 
recommended further changes, a number of alterations in the design occurred: metal trays to 
collect blood were added, the famous angled blade was introduced, and the designers 
abandoned the high platform—now replaced by a basic scaffold. 
  The guillotine may have been similar in form and function to other older devices, but 
it broke new ground: an entire country officially, and unilaterally, adopted this decapitation 
machine for all of its executions. The government shipped the same design out to all regions, 
and each was operated in the same manner, under the same laws; there was to be no local 
variation. Moreover, the guillotine administered a fast and painless death to anyone, 
regardless of age, sex or wealth, an embodiment of such concepts as equality and humanity.  
Prior to the Assembly’s 1791 decree, in France and England generally only the upper classes 
received the privilege of an execution by decapitation. This class-differentiation in modes of 
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execution continued to be the case in much of Europe; however, France's guillotine was 
available to all. 
 Most remarkably, the guillotine was adopted more widely and with more speed than 
most reforms. Born out of a discussion in 1789 that had actually considered banning the 
death penalty, the machine had been used to kill over 15,000 people by the Revolution's close 
in 1799, despite not being fully invented until the middle of 1792. Indeed, by 1795, only a 
year and a half after its first use, the guillotine had decapitated over a thousand people in 
Paris alone. Timing certainly played a part, as the machine was introduced across France 
only months before a bloody new period in the Revolution: the Terror. 
 In 1793,  political events caused a new governmental body to be introduced: The 
Committee of Public Safety. This body was supposed to work quickly and effectively, 
protecting the Republic from enemies and solving problems with the necessary force; in 
practice, it became a dictatorship run by Robespierre. The committee demanded the arrest 
and execution of "anyone who 'either by their conduct, their contacts, their words or their 
writings, showed themselves to be supporters of tyranny, of federalism, or to be enemies of 
liberty.” This loose definition could cover almost everyone, and during the years 1793-4 
Robespierre’s government sent thousands to the guillotine. 
 It is important to remember that of the many who perished during the Terror, most did 
not die by guillotining. Some were shot; others drowned; in Lyons in December 1793, people 
were lined up in front of open graves and shredded by grape-shot from cannons.21 
Nonetheless, the guillotine became synonymous with the period in all of its stark 
contradictions: it was a social and political symbol of equality and humaneness to some and a 
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symbol of tyranny, terror, and death to others (and particularly to the British imagination at 
the time).  
 It is easy to see why the quick, methodical, movement of the machine should have 
transfixed the European imagination. Every execution involved a fountain of blood from the 
victim's neck, and the sheer number of people guillotined could create red pools, if not actual 
flowing streams. Where executioners once prided themselves on their skill, speed now 
became the focus. While only fifty-three people were executed by the Halifax Gibbet 
between 1541 and 1650, some French guillotine executions exceeded that total in a single 
day.22  
The guillotine appears to have enjoyed some affection in France for a time. Indeed, 
popular nicknames like 'the national razor', 'the widow', and 'Madame Guillotine' seem to be 
more accepting than hostile. The gruesome images coupled easily with morbid humor, and 
the machine became a cultural icon affecting fashion, literature, and even children's toys. In 
this respect, the guillotine offered yet another set of contradictions, as such popular 
incarnations reinterpreted a gruesome death-machine as fashionable and even comical 
symbol. In the early years of its use, the guillotine’s symbolism of the Revolution also made 
its popular incarnations as toys and fashion a kind of patriotic act, much like the popular flag-
pins of our own time. After the Terror, the “Victim's Ball” became fashionable: only relatives 
of the executed could attend, and these guests dressed with their hair up and their necks 
exposed, mimicking the condemned.  This paradox of terror and humor often accompanies 
historical moments in which individuals cannot successfully integrate horrific events into 
their psyches; thus, humor appears to be a kind of morbid coping mechanism.  For example, 
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such a dynamic occurred during the Black Death that decimated Europe’s population in the 
Middle Ages (when up to one-third of the population died within a relatively short time); a 
distinctive strain of black humor—a sort of gallows humor—emerged in response to the 
widespread suffering and death from a gruesome, painful disease.  Moreover, executions by 
guillotine were often a popular entertainment that attracted great crowds of spectators. 
Vendors would sell programs listing the names of those scheduled to die. People would come 
day after day and vie for the best seats; knitting female citizens—famous to us from 
Dickens’s Madame Defarge—formed a cadre of hardcore regulars.  Parents would bring their 
children. Toward the end of the Terror, however, attendance thinned considerably.  
 It thinned, perhaps, because the guillotine in daily use seemed to betray its first 
purpose as a humane instrument. However, some observers raised the possibility that the 
very swiftness of the guillotine prolonged the victim's suffering. The blade cut quickly 
enough so that there was relatively little impact on the brain case, and perhaps less likelihood 
of immediate unconsciousness than with a more violent decapitation, or long-drop hanging.  
Execution-watchers told numerous stories of blinking eyelids, speaking, moving eyes, 
movement of the mouth, even an expression of "unequivocal indignation" on the face of the 
decapitated Charlotte Corday when the executioner slapped her face.23 Some British 
expatriates in France described gruesome guillotinings that heightened physical expressions 
of the condemned post-execution, thus provoking British readers’ doubts about the device’s 
alleged “humanitarianism.” The often sympathetic and sentimental descriptions of the 
condemned added to the abolitionist spirit of the age, which Mark Canuel discusses at length 
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in his book on the death penalty and the abolition movement.24   Anatomists and other 
scientists in several countries have tried to perform definitive experiments on severed human 
heads as recently as 1956. Inevitably, the evidence is only anecdotal. What appears to be a 
head responding to the sound of its name, or to the pain of a pinprick, may be only random 
muscle twitching or automatic reflex action, with no awareness involved. It is also possible 
that the massive drop in cerebral blood pressure would have caused victims to lose 
consciousness in several seconds.  However, in the late- eighteenth and early-nineteenth 
centuries, a number of European physiologists conducted experiments to determine what the 
condemned were capable of perceiving post-execution.   
 One of the most famous experiments on criminals condemned to death took place in 
Germany in 1791.25  In the presence of physicians and students assembled at the site of an 
execution by decapitation, the investigator began by demonstrating that exposed parts of the 
torso’s neck muscles quiver when touched with a probe. Deeper contact caused muscular 
contractions strong enough to arch the back and to abduct the arms that had been folded with 
the fingers interdigiated.  A light touch of the probe evoked facial muscle twitches, especially 
around the lips; such grotesque grimaces forced some shuddering observers to leave.  The 
results led to the conclusion that consciousness probably persisted after decapitation. 
The expanding controversy over the possible persistence of consciousness in severed 
heads was fueled by such research and by the journalistic custom of reporting detailed 
results.  On one hand, it was alleged that spontaneous muscular twitches and contractions in a 
freshly severed head devoid of blood manifested the possibility of conscious perception of 
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pain, lasting perhaps for fifteen minutes.  Contrary opinion rested on the assumption that 
there was a direction of flow of an hypothesized life essence called “nerve ether,” or “nerve 
fluid,” which filled the cerebral ventricles.26  A number of physiologists hypothesized that 
sensibility, or consciousness, was engendered by the flow of this fluid along nerves to the 
brain. Consequently, they believed that the almost instantaneous loss of blood after the 
decapitation stopped the supply of “fluid” to the brain and therefore eliminated any 
possibility of consciousness. 
 Repeated experiments merely polarized the conflict. Proponents of consciousness 
cited recent observations made on the head of an executed criminal.27  The criminal died by 
sword on the morning of February 25, 1803, in Breslau. A galvanic device composed of zinc 
and silver plates was used to evoke the previously described strong muscular contractions in 
the head. The investigator then had two assistants hold the head firmly in their hands while 
he stared intently at the face.  When the cut end of the cord was touched with the mechanical 
probe, the lips contorted and the facial muscles reacted in a way which impressed the 
observer in a sure sign of sensed pain.  When a finger was quickly thrust toward the open eye 
of the severed head, the lids closed as though the brain were conscious of an immediate 
threat.  Each time the victim’s name was shouted into an ear, the head’s eyelids opened, the 
gaze turned slowly to that side, and the mouth made opening movements as if trying to 
speak.  These reactions ostensibly confirmed the hypothesis made by the proponents of 
consciousness insofar as they indicated the possibility of continued consciousness, 
perception, and response after decapitation.  Conversely, however, the successful stimulation 
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of the corpse by electricity reinforces the notion of a human as merely biological—to the 
point that facial expressions turn out to be merely biological responses to stimuli that can be 
simulated with the use of electricity.  In a sense, then, this kind of work might have indicated 
the notion of consciousness after execution, but it did not seem to validate the idea of a spirit 
or soul that animates the body from within. 
 A more intriguing study was also performed in 1803 in Mainz on seven criminals 
guillotined.28  A special two-room hut had been built on the site.  The researchers equipped 
one room with galvanic equipment.  The other had an oven for temperature control, and 
contained voltaic columns and Leyden jars for electrical stimulation.  It was hoped that this 
experiment would elucidate the fundamental relationship between galvanism and electricity.  
Physicians, surgeons, pharmacists, and medical students comprised the research team.  Two 
of the students stood directly beneath the scaffold during and after the execution.  It was their 
task to check for any signs of consciousness immediately after decapitation.  One student 
held the head firmly in both hands for concentrated observation of the face, while the other 
shouted, “Do you hear me?” in the ears. Alternating tasks, they did this with seven heads 
whose stationary eyelids varied from total retraction to total occlusion.  In no instance did the 
researchers observe any reaction, and they concluded that loss of consciousness was 
practically instantaneous on decapitation.  The first headless torso entered the galvanic room 
in four minutes.  Stimulation of the exposed end of the spinal cord with cables/wires 
connected to a galvanic apparatus yielded an animated result similar to that of the prior study. 
Ultimately, late-eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century physiologists were unable to 
settle the question of whether the condemned retained some degree of consciousness after 
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execution.  This question continued to inform discussions of the humaneness of the guillotine 
and even the practice of guillotining itself.  After an execution, it was not uncommon for the 
head of the condemned to be picked up and turned toward the body so that the last image the 
condemned would see as he/she exited this world would be blood flowing from his/her 
severed neck. This debate over the consciousness of the condemned also informed 
perceptions of guillotine execution in England and colored the ways in which expatriates 
living in France during the Revolution and the Terror depicted the guillotine in their reports 
back to England. 
It is common in Romantic literary criticism to note the importance of both idealism 
and disappointment in Romantic attitudes.  In particular, the outcome of the French 
Revolution--its quick devolution from the bright dawning of a newly enlightened age to 
gruesome violence--elicited passionate and often discordant attitudes from many Romantic 
writers.  Wordsworth's Prelude, for instance, reflects both the unfettered enthusiasm of his 
more youthful years in France as well as his later dismay over the violence of the Terror.29 
Because many Romantic writers believed that democracy offered a vastly superior system to 
France's ancien regime, they tended to support the Revolution there as the heralding of 
positive change in history.  A number of them, like Wordsworth, spent time in France prior 
to or even during the Revolution, attempting to absorb by osmosis the exciting spirit of that 
time and place.  Those British writers of the period who did not live in France still had access 
to events there via letters from friends abroad, as well as frequent reports in periodicals like 
London's The Times.  Some of the most compelling reports of the period appear in the letters 
of writers like Williams, which provide intriguing "you-are-there" accounts of the 
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Revolution. A number of critics have analyzed the theme of Romantic disappointment--it is a 
constitutive feature of much Wordsworthian criticism.  However, the scope of this 
disappointment must be better understood against the background of such intensely felt initial 
hope (and even euphoria) in expectation of an enlightened, democratic political 
Revolution.  It is this stark contrast that deserves deeper analysis, for such a cognitive 
dissonance is significant in many Romantic works.  
 Perhaps the best symbol of this dissonance between revolutionary idealism and horror 
is the guillotine.  As scholars such as Michel Foucault and Regina Janes have pointed out, the 
guillotine was an invention specially commissioned by the new revolutionary government in 
France as a humane, "enlightened" means of execution; however, it soon came to represent 
the dark violence of the Revolution—especially the notorious period known as The Terror. 
This was especially true in the British public’s perception, since anti-Jacobin propaganda 
emphasized the bloodiest reports from France and often exaggerated disturbing events 
there.  In effect, the guillotine execution attained a distinctive mystique as the symbol par 
excellance of the Terror.   
 Yet the guillotine also channeled into a larger dichotomy that both troubled and 
fascinated Romantic writers.  The ostensible dawn of a new government guided by the 
principles of the Enlightenment suddenly transformed into a period of terrifying 
violence.  Such a pronounced transformation had the effect of placing a dark negative print 
against the previous image of positive, even beautiful political and social change.  The 
violence of the Revolution--exemplified by (often seemingly arbitrary) mob violence and 
guillotine executions--seemed even darker (or redder, in vivid descriptions that emphasized 
blood running in the streets) in immediate contrast to the brightness of all of the initially 
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idealistic hopes for the Revolution. The beauty of what the Romantics assumed to be a 
milestone in human evolution suddenly metamorphosed into its opposite--savage mob 
violence and primitive despotism couched in ostensibly democratic goals.   
         This stark paradox--enlightenment vs. primitivism, democracy vs. despotism, humane 
execution vs. terrifying spectacle, beauty vs. grotesqueness--accounts for many of the themes 
we find in Romantic literature.  Much scholarship focuses particularly on the Gothic 
literature and drama of the period, as well as the commonly used motif of the doppleganger 
(found in works such as Caleb Williams, The Private Confessions of Thomas Hogg, and, or 
course, Frankenstein). Scholars such as Jerrod Hogle have provided extensive analysis of 
motif of the double in Romantic and Gothic literature.30 And while a number of scholars 
recognize the Gothic as the dark side of Romantic paradox expressing fearful, repressed 
emotions; it is important to understand that what is significant about Gothic literature in 
terms of the French Revolution is not simply the way it expresses fears engendered by both 
the ancien regime and the Revolution itself but also the fact that it exists as a compelling 
negative image in an incongruent relationship with the idealism and innocent naivete of 
Romantic emotion. We find this dichotomy in many Romantic works (even non-Gothic 
works).  In fact, as one of the most significant events of the Romantic period, the Terror both 
contributed to and epitomized the foundational structural ambivalence--an almost 
schizophrenic split at times--of the Romantic mind. 
 Beyond its symbolism of this ideological ambivalence, the guillotine also generated 
intriguing ontological questions.  Correlative with a new philosophical emphasis on 
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sensibility during this period (the term denoting human qualities of perception and 
biological/emotional response), a number of scientists and physicians speculated about when 
the condemned individual’s consciousness would cease in a guillotine 
execution.  Reinforcing this debate, some who witnessed guillotine executions recorded the 
strange expressions on the visages of the severed heads post-execution.  Whether these 
expressions demonstrated actual consciousness or merely the odd automatic contortions of a 
dying nervous system was a difficult question to answer, yet witnesses often attributed 
emotions to the dying victims' faces, but these might have been mere fantasies by the 
observers rather than actual occurrences. Nevertheless, such accounts fascinated scientists 
and physicians, and at least one recorded experiment from the period was performed during 
an actual execution to attempt to determine if consciousness continued post-beheading. 
 The significance of such queries corresponds to the larger emphasis on sensibility in 
the eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries.  Offering a new paradigm for thinking about 
human consciousness, the interest in feeling made torture and execution seem more heinous 
than before.  It is no accident that the focus on sensibility intertwined with abolitionist/slave 
writings, anti-capital punishment theories, and concerns about the violence in 
France.31  However, the scientific interest in the guillotine also points to a more fundamental 
question about human consciousness that greatly concerned a generation of philosophers, 
writers, and scientists who were beginning to think in a more profound way about the mind, 
subjective experience, and the essence of consciousness itself (this latter idea often expressed 
in conversations about the slippery concept of the "soul").  Such questions nearly always 
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involve difficult paradoxes, dichotomies such as mind/body (the Cartesian split), 
matter/spirit, and life/death.   
Guillotine execution exemplified such modern paradoxes in an especially powerful 
way. Of course, prior to the development of the guillotine, executions had always been a 
commonplace occurrence, and beheadings were certainly nothing unusual. Yet the clinical, 
mechanical, seemingly exact nature of this new form of execution suddenly entailed a new 
set of horrors in the popular psyche.  The designers of the guillotine regarded the replacement 
of the human element (the executioner) with a machine as a humane improvement, but it also 
replaced the emphasis on an interpersonal act with an intensified focus on the act of dying 
itself, a distinct and clearly delineated moment to capture the popular 
imagination.  Moreover, the collection of heads that accrued beneath the guillotine created a 
sense of the victims as headless, lifeless dolls--a disturbing image to those many who 
preferred to think of human identity in terms of spiritual subjectivity rather than mere 
biological objectivity.   These intriguing paradoxes account for a number of representations 
of the guillotine in British reports/literature.   
 The guillotine thus raised not so much a question but a new pattern of thinking via 
violent juxtaposition and asyndeton, as opposed to the paradigm of organic connection by 
which critics traditionally have understood Romanticism.  This disruptive pattern appears 
pervasively but unpredictably in Regency literature.  
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Chapter Three 
The Guillotine, Materialist Science, and the Historical Context of Mary Shelley’s 
Frankenstein  
I mentioned in my introduction that Mary Shelley’s 1831 introduction to 
Frankenstein, the novel she had published in 1818, has proved a misleading clue to scholars 
of the horror genre as well as to Romanticists.  There she narrates a few anecdontes about the 
summer of 1816 spent with Percy Shelley, Byron, and his physician, John Polidori.  Though 
she does not mention it, Percy Shelley was still married to Harriet Shelley at the time, and 
Mary’s step-sister Claire Clairemont—tactfully unmentioned—was desperately pursuing a 
one-sided affair with Byron, her competition with Mary to catch a poet as a lover. During this 
period, Byron initiated a writing competition mostly among the men in the group, a challenge 
that frustrated her for days: “I thought and pondered—vainly.  I felt that blank incapability of 
invention which is the greatest misery of authorship, when dull Nothing replies to our 
anxious invocations. ‘Have you thought of a story?’ I was asked each morning, and each 
morning I was forced to reply with a mortifying negative.”32  Yet she asserts that creative 
inspiration finally arrived in a nightmare about a frightening creature produced through 
artificial means.  
Scholarship has tended to take Mary Shelley at her word about the novel’s origins in 
a contest and a nightmare.  Frankenstein is thus often understood as the result of a fortuitous 
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spark that generated a mysterious creative outflowing from deep within the writer’s psyche. 
Instead, my analysis emphasizes the historical context that produced Shelley’s narrative, 
specifically the constitutive influence of three particular historical developments of the 
Romantic period:  (1.) the French Revolution; (2.) the intrusion of modern technology into 
life and death processes like execution and childbirth—especially the introduction of 
guillotine execution and the concomitant rise of modern obstetrics in the late eighteeenth 
century; (3.) and the emergence of materialist theories in science and medicine, which 
inspired various sensationalized experiments such as those performed on the corpses of the 
guillotined.  
Due to the guillotine’s significance as a symbol for all three historical 
developments—revolution, the emergence of modern technology, and the rise of materialist 
science—I employ it in my analysis as a metaphorical paradigm for interpreting the 
Frankenstein narrative. The guillotine was a powerful signifier in the British Romantic 
imagination because of its status as both a symbol and a symptom of the period’s historical 
anxieties.  
The Origin of the Frankenstein Concept 
Frankenstein was born in part out of the creative synergy surrounding Mary Shelley 
that summer in Geneva.   She writes of the conversations—“many and long”33—she 
witnessed between her husband and Byron. A number of letters and journal entries also attest 
to their extensive spirited debates about the nature of life and consciousness and the 
implications of recent trends in scientific thought.34  John Polidori, Lord Byron’s personal 
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physician and companion during this period, frequently joined in these discussions, probably 
mentioning somnambulism and night terrors, the subjects of his medical school thesis, and 
the arguments against the death penalty that he had recently advanced in a lengthy essay 
arguing for its abolition.35 Polidori’s presence is significant because it was during this time 
that he wrote a fragment for his later novella The Vampyre, a pioneer in its genre and the 
forerunner of Bram Stoker’s Dracula.    Like Frankenstein, Polidori’s novella explores 
theoretical tensions between ontological categories and expresses anxieties about a number 
of emergent trends in science and philosophy.  Romantic-period novelist Matthew Lewis, the 
writer of the controversial Gothic classic The Monk, was another visitor to the Shelley circle 
that summer. Lewis’s usually-overlooked visit  occurred between his two voyages to his 
plantations in Jamaica. Lewis’s preocuppation in Geneva with the slavery he had witnessed 
in Jamaica casts Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein in a new light.  
Mary Shelley’s retrospective Introduction notes that her circle was fascinated by 
galvanism: she writes that Percy and Byron often pondered the possibility that “perhaps a 
corpse would be reanimated; galvanism had given token of such things: perhaps the 
component part of a creature might be manufactured, brought together, and endued with vital 
warmth.”36   The theory of galvanism was developed by Luigi Galvani, a physicist and 
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husband, Byron, and Polidori.  
 
35 This essay, the product of a long period of research and thought, was completed that 
summer in Switzerland and published in The Pamphleteer later that year. Byron assisted 
Polidori in the editing process.  Coincidentally, at this time Percy Shelley was also working 
on an essay about the death penalty, so this topic likely generated extensive conversations 
between the three men.  
 
36 Shelley, Frankenstein, p. 65. 
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physician who had attained widespread fame in Europe for his experiments in what he 
termed animal electricity, the theory that electricity activates the nervous system in animals 
and humans.  Galvani’s experiments demonstrated a connection between electricity and the 
nervous system’s response, suggesting that the animating life force of human existence might 
be a physical phenomenon (electricity) rather than a spiritual one (the soul). For this reason, 
galvanism was a flashpoint of controversy between Romantic-period materialists and 
religious leaders.37  
Scholars often acknowledge Galvani as an important source for Frankenstein but 
neglect to credit his nephew and successor Giovanni Aldini, whose notoriety was tied to the 
guillotine and who was better known to the British public than his uncle, in part because he 
was fluent in English and French. Aldini travelled throughout Europe conducting 
sensationalistic public experiments on executed corpses—for instance, at the London 
execution of the notorious murderer George Foster at Newgate in 1803—experiments that 
were covered in British newspapers along with their underlying theory, galvanism. 38 Aldini 
first achieved notoriety during the French Revolution for frequenting guillotine executions 
and conducting experiments on the severed heads of the condemned,  “testing” the heads 
post-execution for facial expressions and other signs of residual life and then re-animating 
them with electricity.  Like Victor Frankenstein’s use of corpses for scientific research in 
Mary Shelley’s novel, Aldini searched for the key to life in his experiments on corpses.  In 
fact, guillotine execution attained a distinctive mystique in the popular Romantic imagination 
partly due to Aldini’s famous experiments. 
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  Aldini preferred to utilize corpses who had suffered guillotine execution because of 
its mechanized precision: there was a clarity to the guillotine in that it reduced the act of 
execution to a single moment, a sudden shift from life to death.39  Rather than a more 
extended process in which the instant of death was difficult to discern (as with a hanging, for 
example), the guillotine presented death as a distinct, mechanized switch-point from 
animation to lifelessness.  This aspect of guillotine execution accorded with galvanism’s 
notion that life might be generated or halted abruptly with the application or withdrawal of a 
single electrical charge.  Conversely, popular reports of severed heads exhibiting expressions 
post-guillotining implied that some residual force or “charge” might exist for a time after the 
execution. For Aldini, guillotine execution reinforced galvanic notions about life and death 
processes.  His experiments with guillotined corpses supported a materialist view of 
existence, according to which life is merely the animation of biological material by 
exclusively physical—rather than spiritual—processes.  
Victor Frankenstein the corpse-stealer, like Aldini,  was an eccentric scientist 
callously using the dead in his attempt to regenerate life through the application of electrical 
charges.  And while Shelley’s novel does not specify how Victor’s “subjects” originally died, 
her first readers would have recognized connection between executions and scientific 
experimentation on corpses.  They were connected not only because of Aldini famous 
experiments but also due to the so-called Murder Act of 1751, a controversial prohibition on 
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burying criminals executed for murder that stipulated that their corpses be used for 
dissection.40   
By recognizing Aldini’s role in Frankenstein, we can see more clearly how Shelley’s 
novel activates associations with the guillotine specifically, not just with the widely 
acknowledged context of the French Revolution: Frankenstein evinces the very anxieties and 
tensions symbolized by the guillotine. I argue that viewing Victor as a displacement of Aldini 
allows for a reading of Frankenstein with reference to the guillotine and offers interesting 
new ways of interpreting Shelley’s novel. 
Following the guillotine’s installation as the execution method of the revolutionary 
regime in France, it quickly came to symbolize an assortment of British anxieties about the 
Revolution.  But beyond its evocation of revolution-related fears, the guillotine also 
generated anxiety due to the clinical, seemingly exact nature of this new method of capital 
punishment. Despite the fact that guillotine execution may not seem, to us, very different 
from the beheadings that had been granted to the aristocracy in England for hundreds of 
years, the replacement of an executioner with a mechanized “razor” lent new fear, new 
precision, and new personalization to the act of execution.  The designers of the guillotine 
had regarded the replacement of the human element (the executioner) with a machine as a 
humane improvement, but it also replaced the emphasis on an interpersonal act with an 
intensified focus on the moment of death itself.  As Mike Dash notes, “It was so quick, so 
clean, so bloodily final that it was hard for an execution-going public accustomed to the 
protracted struggles of [earlier execution methods] to believe that life could be extinguished 
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30
quite so swiftly.”41  This aspect of swiftness elicited a particular anxiety, as it seemed, 
unnaturally, to compress death into a single second.  Granted, a decapitation by axe or sword 
typically achieved the same instantaneous result, but it was not uncommon for executioners 
to attempt a beheading two or more times in a flawed effort to sever the head. And while 
guillotine execution itself occasionally required more than one release of the blade—
especially if the machine was faulty or the blade lacked the requisite sharpness—the 
replacement of a swordsman by a machine created a perception of guillotine execution as a 
clinical, instantaneous event rather than a humanized process.   
Paradoxically, the apparently swift guillotine aroused fears of a protracted agony.  
The first guillotine executions provoked a debate emerged about the exact moment of 
consciousness’s cessation.  Some physicists claimed that awareness might continue after 
decapitation. The guillotine thus seemed to suggest an indeterminate ontological state, what 
Rebecca Comray calls a “transitionless transition” that “simultaneously reinforces and erodes 
the distinction between dying and living.”42  She explains that guillotine execution rendered 
death “at once punctual and precise, and radically indeterminate: both incontestable and yet 
infinitely uncertain.”43   
Guillotine execution, though seeming overwhelmingly to support the materialist 
view,  also evoked uncertainty about the relationship between the head (or brain) and body.  
The bodiless heads that accrued beneath the guillotine rendered the victims as headless, 
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lifeless dolls devoid of spiritual subjectivity. That is, replacing the human element had the 
effect of transforming a natural process (death) to a technological one, suggesting an 
emerging modern tension between the categories of nature and technology. Of course, 
guillotine execution did entail a prominent performative element in the sense that great 
attention was given to the prisoner’s behavior prior to execution—his/her comportment 
ascending the scaffold and final words to the audience—but, again, in the actual act of 
guillotining, technology ended these personality-laden moments. 
In this chapter, I will focus on four related existential dichotomies evoked by the 
guillotine—life/death, head/body, matter/spirit, and nature/technology—and their 
manifestations in Mary Shelley’s proto-science-fiction novels Frankenstein and The Last 
Man, as well as Polidori’s novella The Vampyre. In my analysis, I enlist the image of the 
guillotine slice as a metaphor for the line that paradoxically separates and joins opposing 
sides of the ontological dichotomies listed above.  The novels examined in this essay 
interrogate these theoretical slicings by simultaneously blurring and sharpening the 
boundaries between existential states. For example, even as Shelley’s novels merge 
categories of life and death through repeated descriptions of their protagonists as barely alive 
or death-like, they also frequently emphasize the sharp discordance between life and death. 
We see this paradox in the Frankenstein narrative, which classifies the Creature as alive but 
inhuman and repeatedly describes Victor in terms suggestive of death. The Last Man 
employs a similar motif. Forced to witness the plague’s widespread ravages of the plague and 
burdened with the constant anticipation of bereavement and death, Lionel Verney exists 
uncomfortably between existential states, the specter of death constantly intruding into life. 
We can also see this paradox functioning in John Polidori’s The Vampyre, which, with its 
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invention of the undead aristocrat, originated the now ubitquitous vampire of modern cinema 
as an elegant figure who preyes on the living and gains eternal life through the death of his 
victims. This descriptive collapsing of the line between existence and death suggests the 
same preoccupation with boundaries underlying popular discussions of the guillotine in the 
Romantic period—in which the sharp juxtapositions or slices of guillotine execution were 
symbolically symptomatic of unresolved paradoxes inherent in modern ontological 
categories. 
One such juxtaposition in Frankenstein appears in Victor Frankenstein’s discussion 
of his early research, which involved studying corpses and observing processes of biological 
decay.  In one passage in particular, Victor thus explains the rationale for his morbid 
scientific approach:  
Whence, I often asked myself, did the principle of life proceed? To examine the 
causes of life, we must first have recourse to death. I observed the natural decay and 
corruption of the human body…I saw how the fine form of man was degraded and 
wasted.  I beheld the corruption of death succeed to the blooming cheek of life; I saw 
how the worm inherited the wonders of the eye and brain. I paused, examining and 
analyzing all the minutiae of causation from life to death, and death to life.44  
Victor here emphasizes death as the key to understanding life, a paradox juxtaposing two 
seemingly antonymic states. He focuses on the grotesque “corruption of the human body” 
and “pauses” over the “causation from life to death, and death to life”; in effect, he asserts 
that understanding death is necessary for understanding life.45     
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Mary Shelley also presents this problematic life/death dichotomy in categorizing the 
Creature.  Neither human nor inhuman, the Creature exists on the metaphorical slice between 
antithetical categories, in an indeterminate zone somewhere between life and death.  In the 
sense that he is sentient, he is very much alive; but as the derivative product of lifeless 
corpses, he is existentially inauthentic.  In fact, Mary Shelley’s Creature, a combination of 
disparate parts birthed by electricity, resembles a machine, foreshadowing the cyborgs of 
modern science fiction.  Taken as a whole, Shelley’s novel regards the Creature as neither 
completely dead nor alive and yet both at the same time, blurring the line between two 
seemingly exclusive states of existence. 
Victor, too, exists on this slice between categories:  enervated, lifeless, and outside of 
strict ontological categories (neither fully alive nor dead).   In one typical passage, Victor 
bemoans this sense of indeterminacy: 
The blood flowed freely in my veins, but a weight of despair and remorse 
pressed on my heart, which nothing could remove. Sleep fled from my eyes; I 
wandered like an evil spirit . . . . this state of mind preyed on my health, which 
had perhaps never entirely recovered from the first shock it had sustained. I 
shunned the face of man; all sound of joy or complacency was torture to me; 
solitude was my only consolation—deep, dark, deathlike solitude.46 
Victor’s internal sense of his indeterminacy corroborates the observation of an outside 
observer, Walton: 
Margaret, if you had seen the man who thus capitulated for his safety, your 
surprise would have been boundless. His limbs were nearly frozen, and his 
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body dreadfully emaciated by fatigue and suffering. I never saw a man in so 
wretched a condition.  We attempted to carry him into the cabin; but as soon 
as he had quitted the fresh air, he fainted. We accordingly brought him back to 
the deck, and restored him to animation by rubbing him with brandy and 
forcing him to swallow a small quantity.  As soon as he showed signs of life 
we wrapped him up in blankets…”47 
Shelley thus introduces Victor as a barely-conscious, emaciated body wrapped in blankets 
like a corpse wrapped in burial cloths.  
Shelley consolidates the representation of Victor as half-alive, ever on the verge of 
slipping entirely into death, in order to emphasize his figurative burial under a weight of 
depression, guilt, and despair.  In effect, she suggests that psychologically Victor exists in a 
liminal state between life and death—physically barely alive and yet always ill, conscious 
and yet always suffering emotionally, frequently yearning for death. Incidentally, Victor’s 
suicidal ideation is congruent with a different antinomy:  idealism/horror.  His abrupt shift 
from youthful optimism to its inverse, horror, functions as a photographic negative, with 
despair juxtaposed in sharp relief against the character’s earlier idealism.  We see this 
juxtaposition in Victor’s abrupt attitudinal change after the Creature’s “birth”:  
The different accidents of life are not so changeable as the feelings of human 
nature. I had worked hard for nearly two years, for the sole purpose of 
infusing life into an inanimate body . . . . I had desired it with an ardour that 
far exceeded moderation; but now that I had finished, the beauty of the dream 
vanished, and breathless horror and disgust filled my heart…I slept indeed, 
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but I was disturbed by the wildest of dreams. I thought I saw Elizabeth in the 
bloom of health, walking in the streets of Ingolstadt.  Delighted and surprised, 
I embraced her, but as I imprinted the first kiss on her lips, they became livid 
with the hue of death…I thought that I held the corpse of my dead mother in 
my arms; a shroud enveloped her form, and I saw the grave-worms crawling 
in the folds of flannel.48   
This passage presents a distinct discordance between ardent idealism and “breathless” horror 
that correlates with its juxtaposition the antonymic states of life and death.  
Furthermore, Victor’s focus on life’s materiality evokes an anxiety about the 
ontological dichotomy matter/spirit.  In effect, Frankenstein emphasizes a materialist view of 
life to the exclusion of a spiritual perspective, in which graphic terms like “corpse” and 
“grave-worms” and Elizabeth’s sudden decay from a youthful girl into a rotting corpse trump 
any notion of an extra-material reality. Victor’s materialism also informs his preoccupation 
with “the natural decay and corruption of the human body,” in accordance with his father’s 
“greatest precautions that my mind should be impressed with no supernatural horrors . . . . a 
churchyard was to me merely the receptacle of bodies deprived of life, which from being the 
seat of beauty and strength had become food for the worm.”49 Even after Victor regrets 
giving life to the Creature, he does not venture into theological arguments or give 
consideration to whether the Creature might have a soul—spiritual considerations are absent 
from the novel, save for occasional references to the Creature as an “abomination” and a 
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“demon.”50  Victor’s motivation for despising his creation seems not to be spiritual/religious 
guilt but a basic, involuntary feeling of revulsion.  A materialist view also underlies Victor’s 
responses to the deaths of Elizabeth and Henry Clerval: he does not speculate on their 
existence in an afterlife but instead refers to them as merely corpses, a description he also 
invokes when referencing his dead mother and William.  
All in all, then, Victor’s perspective evinces a distinctively modern sensibility 
inherent in materialist theories that emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; that 
is, materialism contested the older religious concept of life as essentially spiritual.  For 
Victor, the “soul” does not figure into life and death processes, nor does any divine giver of 
life. He asserts a theoretical equivalency between life and death as interchangeable aspects of 
an exclusively material biological cycle.  
An anxiety about ontological categories also underlies Mary Shelley’s allusions to 
slavery.51   A number of scholars have connected Frankenstein to contemporaneous 
controversies about slavery and abolition, citing passages like the Creature’s declaration that 
he will not submit to “abject slavery” and Victor’s fear of the subjugation of the human race: 
“Even if [the Creature and his mate] were to leave Europe, and inhabit the deserts of the new 
world, yet one of the first results of those sympathies for which the daemon thirsted would be 
children, and a race of devils would be propagated upon the earth, who might make the very 
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existence of the species of man a condition precarious and full of terror.”52 In addition to 
their political resonance, I stress that allusions to slavery reinforce the novel’s larger 
anxieties about ontological categories. For just as the Creature in Frankenstein exists in an 
indeterminate, contested space between seemingly distinct categories (life/death, 
human/inhuman), so does the slave, historically speaking. We see this in the political and 
philosophical debates about slavery during this period, which often focused on the slave’s 
ontological status—whether he was human or subhuman.  The force of Mary Shelley’s 
adducing slavery/freedom to her novel’s antinomies is clearer if we examine the under-
studied fact of Matthew Lewis’s visit to Geneva in 1816.  An owner of a large estate of 
plantations in Jamaica (inherited recently from his father), Lewis devoted much of his time to 
the management of his estate and of its numerous slaves.  At the time of his visit to Geneva, 
Lewis was preoccupied with his Jamaican plantations; in fact, his stay in Geneva occurred 
between two separate voyages he made to Jamaica to oversee his extensive estates.  
Consequently, while in Geneva, Lewis frequently discussed with Percy Shelley and Byron 
the management and treatment of the many Jamaican slaves he owned.  
Lewis’s opinions on slavery exemplify widespread European attitudes and their 
contradictions. While opposing the emancipation of the currently enslaved—primarily for 
economic reasons—Lewis supported the abolition of any trade that would newly enslave 
Africans. He treated his Jamaican slaves in an exceptionally humanely, assuming their basic 
inferiority and incapacity for self-sufficiency. Lewis’s journals discuss the “law of 
provisions,” which permitted the slaves a day to tend their plots of land, and advocating the 
provision limit to once a week so that the slaves would not gather too much at once and end 
                                                 
52 Shelley, Frankenstein, p. 107.  
  
38
up trading for alcohol, which, in turn, would soon send them begging.53 Lewis’s 
condescension toward the slaves validated (for himself) his authority over them and 
justifying their enslavement.54 
While in Geneva, Lewis added to his will a codicil stipulating that his heirs must visit 
the plantations regularly and must maintain his humanitarian reforms. The codicil was 
witnessed by Byron, Shelley and Polidori, who apparently were willing to countenance 
Lewis’s continued support of slavery’s continuance. By recognizing Lewis’s importance, I 
will complicate the more familiar narrative of Frankenstein’s origin in ghosts, galvanism and 
thunderstorms. Lewis’s preoccupation with his Jamaican plantations suggests the likelihood 
that he conversed about slavery with the Shelley circle and that references to slavery in 
Frankenstein are intentional and significant.  
Lewis’s connection to West Indian slavery also provides deeper insight into the 
Creature’s agreement to a permanent exile in South America in exchange for a wife.  By 
recognizing Lewis’s influence, we can see an implicit allusion to the West Indian slave 
revolts, specifically the Haitian Revolution of 1791-1804, the only successful slave rebellion 
antedating Frankenstein’s composition.55  The Haitian Revolution began as a violent uprising 
against plantations and slaveholders led by the notorious Jamaican-born voodoo priest Dutty 
Bookman, who was said to have initiated the revolt with a voodoo ceremony that included an 
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animal sacrifice and the drinking of human blood.  According to reports widely circulated in 
Europe, Bookman controlled his army using voodoo “black magic,” apparently a sort of 
group hypnosis. Bookman’s army of slaves raided 1800 plantations in seven days, killing 
over a thousand slaveholders and constituting, for the European public,  a deliberate 
campaign of "pillage, rape, torture, mutilation, and death.”56   When the Haitian rebellion 
succeeded in 1804 under Toussaint Louverture (also reported to be a voodoo practitioner), 
fears abounded in England that its territory in the West Indies—particularly Jamaica—might 
undergo a similar violent revolution.  
One element of the Haitian Revolution little-mentioned by Romanticists was its 
reliance on the machete as the slaves’ primary weapon.  At the time, however, the machete 
had acquired a horrific mystique in the popular European imagination.  Much like today 
(with its link to genocidal atrocities on the “dark continent” of Africa) the machete carried a 
whole set of racial connotations. I would argue that the machete’s symbolism of 
revolutionary atrocity in the Romantic Period, along with the fear specifically inspired by its 
blade—with its power to slice, maim, and decapitate—makes it a symbolic cousin of the 
guillotine. That is, while both the guillotine and the machete connected Enlightenment-era 
revolution, the mechanized, “modern” aspects of the guillotine separated it from the 
supposed primitiveness of the West Indian slave revolts.    Perhaps the machete’s primitive 
connotations accounts for its popularity in narratives that foreground apocalypse and human 
savagery; we see this dynamic quite markedly in the popular zombie genre, as I will discuss 
in a later chapter.  
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 The popular-culture connection between revolution and zombies surprisingly is 
relevant to Frankenstein.  Those scholars who have noted Mary Shelley’s allusions to slavery 
have missed an important implication of this historical connection. Because Europeans 
during this period associated the West Indian slave revolts with voodoo magic, I would argue 
that Shelley’s allusion to the Haitian uprisings entail a related notion of voodoo.  Of 
particular significance to me is the term popularly applied to those believed to be controlled 
by voodoo hypnosis: “zombies.”  The term zombie originated within the  
voodoo tradition and still carries this particular connotation among those familiar with 
voodoo practices.  A recent Halloween-inspired article in The New York Times, entitled “A 
Zombie is a Slave Forever,” explains the significance of the zombie in voodoo and the way 
that it came to symbolize the horrors of slavery in the West Indies:   
Most people think of them as the walking dead, a being without a soul or someone 
with no free will. This is true. But the zombie is not an alien enemy who’s been 
[produced] by Hollywood. He is a New World phenomenon that arose from the 
mixture of old African religious beliefs and the pain of slavery, especially the 
notoriously merciless and coldblooded slavery of French-run, pre-independence 
Haiti…Suicide was a frequent recourse of the slaves, who were handy with poisons 
and powders…And yet, the fear of becoming a zombie might stop them from doing 
so…To become a zombie was the slave’s worst nightmare: to be dead and still a 
slave, an eternal field hand. It is thought that slave drivers on the plantations, who 
were usually slaves themselves and sometimes Voodoo priests, used this fear of 
zombification to keep recalcitrant slaves in order.57 
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Historically, then, the figure of the zombie functioned symbolically in two distinct ways with 
respect to slavery: as the article explains, the threat of being rendered a zombie discouraged 
slaves from suicide and revolution, while simultaneously the popular perception of the 
Haitian revolutionaries as unconscious voodoo victims endowed them with a powerful, 
frightening mystique. 
As I noted, the Creature shares with the historical figure of the slave an indeterminate, 
contested position between ontological categories of life/death and human/subhuman. The 
voodoo zombie also exists indeterminately between these ontological categories. In fact, the 
zombie’s ontological indeterminacy is more pronounced than the slave’s, since a zombie—
depicted as unconscious, ghoulish, and corpse-like—exists even more uneasily on the slice 
between ontological categories. Thus, the zombie evokes complementary anxiety to that 
provoked by guillotine decapitation. Both worries fixate on one component continuing to 
function after separation. In the case of the zombie, the body continues to function without 
the brain; whereas, after guillotine decapitation, the brain was thought to function for several 
minutes apart from the body.  
Beyond the issue of ontological status, I would argue that the implicit allusions in 
Frankenstein to slavery and the Haitian Revolution are ultimately significant because they 
allow us to identify the Creature as a literary ancestor of one of the most popular “monsters” 
to later emerge in modern cinema—the sci-fi zombie.58  That is to say, Mary Shelley’s 
association of the Creature with the slave rebellions in Haiti also functions as a link between 
her futuristic theme of artificial reproduction and the traditional zombie mythology of Haitian 
voodoo.  This conflation—however unconscious and unintentional on the author’s part—of 
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the novel’s central science-fiction concept with an antiquated voodoo superstition is 
intriguing in its prescience, insomuch as it anticipated the way in which twentieth-century 
sci-fi/horror films would oneday re-conceptualize the notion of the zombie—transforming it 
from the traditional slave-ghoul of voodoo superstition into a modern bio-monster born of 
scientific hubris.  
The figure of the zombie is relevant not only to Mary Shelley’s references to slavery 
in Frankenstein but also to her depiction of Victor at certain times in the novel. The 
increasing lifelessness with which she frequently characterizes him seems oddly reminiscent 
of the undead zombies of Haitian voodoo and certain modern horror films.  As I discussed 
earlier, it is the Creature who most apparently shares an indeterminate ontological status with 
the zombies of later literature and film; however, I would argue that it is Victor whom 
Shelley most often describes in terms evocative of a zombie—as listless, semi-dead, 
emotionally hollowed-out, and emaciated.   And yet at alternate moments in the text, we also 
frequently perceive Victor on the hyperactive end of the behavioral spectrum.  On those 
occasions where he does not exhibit a lifeless despondency, he conversely seems overcome 
with an inexplicable mania.   I would argue that Victor’s mania also supports this zombie-
like characterization:  rather than indicating physical and mental vigor, Victor’s hyperactivity 
suggests, again, a kind of ontological vacancy, one that is merely camouflaged by his frenetic 
speech and activity.  That is, his frenzied behavior is no more reflective of interior 
substance/solidity than his periods of listlessness. Elizabeth’s murder demonstrates the 
impotence underlying Victor’s mania, for despite his frenzied anxiety on his wedding night, 
he fails to recognize the Creature’s obvious intention to kill Elizabeth—completely 
abandoning her at the critical moment.  In fact, Victor’s hyper-vigilant behavior in this scene 
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constitutes a futile pantomime performance rather than a legitimate defensive effort. 
Therefore, like his frequent depressive moods, Victor’s manic episodes signify a kind of 
vacuity and interior emptiness or deficiency at the core of Victor’s character. 
My point in emphasizing this deficiency is that in a certain sense, such a 
characterization negates Victor ontologically: that is, his manic-depressive extremes do not 
suggest a deep, multi-layered psychic interior but rather the opposite.   Essentially, his 
enervation and his mania are two expressions of the same psychic insubstantiality.  
Moreover, I would argue that the frequent suggestions of Victor’s narcissism in Frankenstein 
support this perspective, since psychological theories about narcissism have typically 
understood it as symptomatic of an absence at the core of the psyche.59  Therefore, such a 
characterization gives to Victor an indeterminate ontological status and renders him a kind of 
zombie figure.  His extreme depressive and manic behaviors correspond to the two distinct 
notions of the zombie prevalent in popular culture—either slow-moving and enervated, or, 
conversely, frenzied and rabid. 60 
The convergence, via the machete, of guillotine-related anxieties and slavery, 
foreshadows another convergence with the guillotine of the apparently unrelated matter of 
obstetrics. Mary Shelley had only recently given birth to her second child, William, prior to 
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arriving in Geneva that summer.61 The presence in Geneva of Claire Clairemont, several 
months pregnant with Byron’s child, reinforced a preoccupation with reproduction. It is a 
truism of Frankenstein scholarship that the novel is deeply engaged with reproductive 
anxieties, not ony the current ones but the longstanding factor of Wollstonecraft’s death in 
childbirth from puerperal fever. Ellen Moers initiated the view that Frankenstein should be 
read as "a birth myth” due to Mary Shelley’s “chronic and chaotic experience with 
motherhood”:  
Pregnant at sixteen, and almost constantly pregnant throughout the following five 
years; yet not a secure mother, for she lost most of her babies soon after they were 
born; and not a lawful mother, for she was not married—not at least when, at the age 
of eighteen, Mary Godwin began to write Frankenstein. So are monsters born.62  
Treating the novel as a displaced autobiography, Moers reads the monster’s birth as a 
metaphor for distraught young, middle-class woman's anxiety about failed motherhood.63 
If we look more widely than Mary Shelley’s own life, we see that Frankenstein was 
published at a time when traditional attitudes about reproduction were being supplanted by 
obstetrical theories and practices that originated in France and spread to other European 
countries.64  This new “scientific” perspective understood childbirth as a medical condition 
that required the oversight of male physicians—obstetricians—who gradually replaced 
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traditional female midwives. Obstetricians asserted that the profession required extensive 
medical expertise and the use of surgical instruments, such as the recently-invented curette, a 
surgical tool used to remove the uterine lining or its contents by scraping and scooping. 
Curettage remains the second step of the common D&C procedure (dilation and curettage) 
still performed after miscarriages and abortions. The supplanting of midwifery by obstetrics 
and its instruments loosely resembled galvanism’s goal of generating life artificially through 
technological intervention. This period also saw a considerable increase in the publication of 
childbirthing manuals, a trend which scholars such as Alan Bewell largely attribute to the 
emergence of modern obstetrics.65 These obstetrics manuals all stress the importance of a 
knowledge of anatomy and physiology; they also give advice on the symptoms and diagnosis 
of pregnancy, the disorders peculiar to pregnant women, and various ways to determine the 
sex of an unborn child. Delivery methods are frequently dealt with in detail, often with plate 
illustrations of the different kinds of births that a midwife may confront. Some books also 
comment on the lying-in period and on the diseases of new mothers and their infants. My 
argument for the surprising metaphoric convergence of obstetrical instruments with the 
guillotine is strengthened by an understudied feature of Galvani’s career: before he 
conducted his famous electric experiments, he was one of Europe’s pioneer obstetricians, 
serving as the Chair of Obstetrics at the University of Bologna’s Institute of Sciences and 
later as the Institute’s president.  
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The rise of obstetrics coincided with the emergence of modern permissiveness about 
birth control and abortion, especially in France.66 The French Revolution by superceding 
church law, legalized practices that had previously been forbidden, including birth control, 
non-procreative sex acts, and pornography. Of course these had all existed before, but they 
had been legally suppressed. Respectable young girls in France in 1785 were as limited in 
their knowledge of sex and birth control as their counterparts in Britain. However, in 1796, 
that had entirely changed. It was now perfectly legal to sell condoms openly and to instruct 
buyers on how to use them, as well as to inform the public about the rhythm method or about 
non-procreative sex acts; pulpy novels featuring such subjects also became legal.67 
While the French proceeded in one direction regarding abortion, the British moved in 
another, demonstrates R. Sauer: “The view that the fetus was alive from conception gained in 
popularity.”  This sentiment resulted in the 1803 passage of the Ellenborough Act, which 
prohibited abortion after “quickening”—when a woman first feels fetal movement (16-20 
weeks)—and established the death penalty for those convicted (although this penalty was 
rarely sought in abortion-related prosecutions).  In 1837, the government extending the 
Ellenborough Act by removing the distinction between abortion conducted before and after 
quickening. 68  Such measures indicate the controversy at the time about the status of the 
fetus, but then—as today—the British public was hardly uniform in its opinion on the 
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subject.69 In fact, a number of historians suggest that abortion (frequently illegal) as well as 
infanticide occurred far more often in Britain at this time than the political climate of the time 
suggests.  Saur comments further that “many children in the early 1800s were . . . . so 
unwanted as to become victims of infanticide.”70   
Abortion and infanticide are familiar motifs in Frankenstein criticism, resting chiefly 
on the Creature’s self-description as “the miserable and the abandoned” and “an abortion,” as 
well as on Victor’s abortion-like destruction of the female Creature.71 What is significant to 
me about these allusions is that abortion and infanticide necessarily point to the 
indeterminate ontological status of the fetus/infant, just as the Creature occupies a contested 
position on the boundary between human/inhuman, alive/dead.  The fact that the Creature 
presents the same kind of categorical uncertainty as the fetus explains why zombie and 
vampire films—the modern-day versions of “undead” monsters—usually include a subplot 
involving abortion/infanticide. Just like the zombie, the vampire, and Frankenstein’s 
Creature, the fetus exists on the slice within ontological antinomies.  
We see this concern even in today’s debates about abortion, which often involve 
discussions about who possesses the more important ontological status (whose life is more 
important), the fetus or the mother? I would also note that the unique relationship between 
mother and fetus/infant—in which the fetus/infant is not totally separate from but in fact is 
interrelated with and dependent on the mother—offers a unique challenge to the idea of 
stable ontological categories; in this sense, the fetus and mother exist on their own 
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metaphorical slice somewhere between two seemingly oppositional states (self/other, 
life/death).  Perhaps this indeterminacy is one reason why the figure of the monstrous mother 
is so popular in gothic literature and film.72  
Frankenstein’s Literary Sibling: John Polidori’s The Vampyre 
Another notable Romantic work that grew out of the famous collaborative summer at 
Lake Geneva was John Polidori’s novella The Vampyre. Scholarship on The Vampyre, the 
forerunner of Bram Stoker’s Dracula, acknowledges the fact that Polidori’s story originated 
in a story Byron conceived during this summer that both spent with the Shelleys in Geneva.  
As a corollary to Frankenstein—in date and place of origin and in similar thematic 
preocuppations—The Vampyre offers additional insights on the modern anxieties expressed 
in Mary Shelley’s novel. 
 The Vampyre was first published in 1819 in the New Monthly Magazine with the false 
attribution "A Tale by Lord Byron." The name of the work's protagonist, "Lord Ruthven," 
added to this assumption, for that name was originally used in Lady Caroline Lamb's novel 
Glenarvon, in which a thinly-disguised Byron figure was also named Lord Ruthven. (Also, 
the fact that Polidori’s novel expanded an idea originally expressed by Byron that summer in 
1816 also added to the confusion somewhat.)  Despite repeated denials by Byron and 
Polidori, the authorship often went unclarified—a point of irritation for Polidori especially. 
(A later book publication correctly cited Polidori as the author.)  The story was an immediate 
popular success, partly because of the Byron attribution and partly because it exploited the 
gothic horror predilections of the public. Polidori transformed the vampire from a character 
in folklore into the modern aristocratic figure still recognized today. 
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 The original fragment written by Byron that inspired Polidori to write his novella first 
appeared under the title "A Fragment" in the 1819 collection Mazeppa: A Poem.  Byron 
wrote his story in an epistolary form with the narrator recounting the events that had occurred 
in a letter. The narrator embarks on a journey or "Grand Tour" to the East with an elderly 
man, Augustus Darvell. During the journey, Darvell becomes physically weaker, "daily more 
enfeebled.”73 They both arrive at a Turkish cemetery between Smyrna and Ephesus near the 
columns of Diana. Near death, Darvell reaches a pact with the narrator not to reveal his 
impending death to anyone. A stork appears in the cemetery with a snake in its mouth. After 
Darvell dies, the narrator is shocked to see that his face turns black and his body rapidly 
decomposes: "I was shocked with the sudden certainty which could not be mistaken — his 
countenance in a few minutes became nearly black. I should have attributed so rapid a 
change to poison, had I not been aware that he had no opportunity of receiving it 
unperceived."74  According to Polidori, Byron intended to have Darvell reappear, alive again, 
as a vampire, but did not finish the story. Polidori's account of Byron's story indicates it 
"depended for interest upon the circumstances of two friends leaving England, and one dying 
in Greece, the other finding him alive upon his return, and making love to his sister."75 
Interestingly, this narrative fear over the seduction of a woman by a vampire indicates that 
from the beginning, the modern vampire tradition formulated by Byron/Polidori incorporated 
a distinct set of anxieties about sexuality.   
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 Building upon Byron’s original story fragment, Polidori’s novella greatly modified 
the earlier characterization of vampires in Eastern European folklore, which depicted rabid, 
grotesque creatures—usually dead peasants.  Polidori transformed this unattractive figure of 
folklore into an intelligent, refined aristocrat who seduces his victims; he also added the 
notion that vampires were nocturnal and found sunlight poisonous. Significantly, Polidori’s 
narrative emphasizes the indeterminate ontological status of the vampire, just as Mary 
Shelley’s two horror novels feature characters existing outside strict categories of 
human/inhuman and life/death. Like the Creature, the vampire is “undead” and therefore on 
the metaphorical slice within such dichotomies.  
 It is unsurprising that The Vampyre is preoccupied with the tension between 
ontological categories, since its original inspiration in Geneva that famous summer occurred 
at the same time in which Byron and Polidori were revising Polidori’s essay “On the 
Punishment of Death” in preparation for its publication in a political periodical The 
Pamphleteer. Influenced by the Italian criminologist Beccaria, Polidori's critique of the death 
penalty was the culmination of a year’s study of execution practices in Europe, including 
guillotine execution.76  Unlike Percy Shelley’s essay against capital punishment—written at 
nearly the same time—Polidori’s essay incorporated medical opinion (as he was a physician) 
in addition to the ethical considerations typically found in writings of this sort. Beyond his 
interest in the death penalty, Polidori’s research prior to that summer in Geneva had focused 
on two other intriguing topics: sleepwalking and night terrors. In fact, these were the official 
subjects of his final thesis in medical school, which had required two years’ research and 
composition. Polidori’s interest in sleepwalking shares with his concern over the death 
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penalty a focus on oppositional categories (consciousness vs. unconsciousness, life/death, 
etc.).  It is no surprise, then, that The Vampyre frequently expresses an anxiety about an 
“undead” creature existing on the blurred boundary between antonymic categories. 
Moreover, Polidori also frequently describes the protagonist in a way suggestive of death 
(similar to the way Mary Shelley depicts Victor Frankenstein at times): “He was confined to 
his chamber. There he would often lie for days, incapable of being roused.  He had become 
emaciated, his eyes had attained a glassy lustre.”77   Such descriptions occur frequently in 
Polidori’s narrative, indicating that the protagonist—like the vampire—occupies an uneasy 
status on the slice between life/death. Furthermore, like Victor’s vision of his 
mother/Elizabeth’s corpse in Frankenstein, Polidori’s novel frequently focuses on the 
horrific materiality of biological processes. In a scene in which the protagonist discovers a 
dead woman, Polidori writes of her “lifeless corpse” where “upon her neck and breast was 
blood, and upon her throat were the marks of teeth having opened the vein…”78 Thus in 
Polidori’s text, we find a similar anxiety about the material vs. spiritual nature of existence 
that we find in Frankenstein. 
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Chapter Four 
Modern Apocalypse and Ontological Anxiety in Mary Shelley’s The Last Man 
Like Shelley’s earlier novel, her proto-science-fiction novel The Last Man expresses 
anxieties about the tension between ontological categories such as life/death, spirit/matter, 
mind/body, and nature/technology—or nature/civilization, to put it another way.  Such 
anxieties are often depicted in modern film in the form of apocalyptic narratives,  in which 
civilization disintegrates in response to the threat of human extinction. As apocalypse is a 
prominent topic in a number of twentieth-century and post-millenium films, I contend that 
the thematic influence of The Last Man has been underestimated and that its evocation of 
ontological anxieties and apocalyptic themes make it—like Frankenstein—a kind of literary 
ancestor to a number of later science fiction and horror films.  For this reason, I argue that 
The Last Man deserves greater critical attention.  
Apocalypse was a subject of interest to a number of Romantic painters, most 
famously John Martin, and Romantic writers, including Byron, whose poem “Darkness” 
describes the end of the world due to the extinguishment of the sun.95 The reasons for this 
theme’s emergence is manifold, but a major cause lies in the ontological and existential 
anxieties suggested by emerging scientific theories and discoveries, nascent during the 
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Romantic period and continuing into twentieth-century and post-millenium eras.96 Among 
the apocalyptic works produced during the Romantic period, The Last Man  is the most 
distinctive: while a number of works of catastrophe and apocalypse from the eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries are underwritten by a recognizably Christian teleology, Shelley’s 
novel avoids religious sentiments in favor of a materialist scientific perspective.  The Last 
Man is also totally unique for its time in its focus on the literal extinction of a the human 
species through a decidely plausible scientific scenario—disease and contagion—rather than 
the mysterious—almost supernatural—cosmic forces depicted in Byron’s poem. Also 
significant is the emphasis of The Last Man on the paradox of human death against the 
background of nature’s larger perpetual processes.  Depicting humankind’s status as merely 
an ephemeral part of nature’s larger processes, Shelley explores the disconnect between 
humanity as an important manifestation of nature and humanity as an insignificant, 
expendable element of the larger world and in this respect, anticipates modern apocalyptic 
narratives in science fiction and horror cinema. 
 
 A Modern Apocalyptic Narrative   
 Although a number of critics affirm that The Last Man is a proto-science fiction 
novel, no critic has investigated this claim on its merits or devoted any significant attention to 
the role of science itself within the novel.  Instead, critics merely note the work’s futuristic 
setting while at the same time finding fault with its inability or unwillingness to incorporate 
the technological advancements (gadgetry and such) that typically proliferates in modern 
science fiction.  Yet to dismiss the significance of science in The Last Man is to miss the 
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importance of Shelley’s narrative in the context of the scientific climate in which she lived, 
an environment in which evolutionary and materialist theories were taking hold and replacing 
older traditional paradigms in both science and philosophy.  It is important to understand the 
scientific context for Shelley’s writing because her novel concerns itself with a number of 
scientific paradoxes with which the best minds of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
grappled.  Moreover, with tremendous advances in the fields of biology, geology, and 
paleontology, the notion of extinction preoccupied the Romantic imagination and added to 
the Romantic celebration of the human relationship to nature a contrary fear of nature’s 
dangers and its essential otherness—its divorce from humanity.   
 There is every reason to assume that Mary Shelley was well educated on scientific 
debates of her time.  The fact that Percy Shelley possessed a deep interest in the sciences 
suggests that Mary benefited from participating in conversations about such matters, and it is 
known that his wife shared his interest in the theories of Erasmus Darwin and Georges 
Buffon.97  Commonly regarded as a proto-evolutionary thinker, Erasmus Darwin believed 
that variations acquired by one generation could be passed to the next generation, so that 
nature would produce higher and more complex organisms over many generations, and he 
favored a developmental perspective over the old mechanistic theory of the past.98  The 
naturalist Georges Buffon supported the idea of a much longer history—75,000 years—for 
the Earth than the biblical model allowed, accepted the idea of the descent of closely related 
species from a common ancestor, and promoted the theory of spontaneous generation and a 
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general fixity of forms (with, however, the possibility of more superficial change across 
generations).  Buffon did not accept the notion of a divine creator or supernatural design, and 
his teleological model for Earth opposed the traditional biblical model and also predicted the 
extinction of life due to a final ice age.99  From her interactions with Percy and her own 
personal study, by the time Mary Shelley wrote her first novel, Frankenstein, Anne Mellor 
suggests that she already possessed “an extensive understanding of the science of her day,” 
which no doubt contributed to her inclusion of scientific ideas in The Last Man. 
 Beyond the theories of Darwin and Buffon, she was also likely familiar with the 
notions of Georges Cuvier, due to the widespread readership and popularity of his writing, 
which promoted the notion of the extinction of species from occasional catastrophic events 
like floods.100  Shelley was also quite familiar with Thomas Malthus’s dire predictions of 
eventual overpopulation and famine and his assessment of nature as a realm of crowding and 
harsh competition for limited resources.101  
 Fiona Stafford describes the profound interest in catastrophe and extinction during the 
Romantic Period: 
The general acceptance of the idea of extinction owed much to the eighteenth-century 
obsession with natural history…The fear of extinction, no longer associated solely 
with the Apocalyptic end of mankind but rather with the gradual disappearance of 
particular human societies and natural species, began to spread rapidly…it was a 
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highly significant development: the old theological tradition of fixed species (which 
asserted that God had created every kind of plant or creature, perfect and immutable, 
at the beginning of time) was gradually breaking down, and being replaced by the 
more modern notion that new species could appear, while others vanished forever.102 
This troubling discordance between comfortable theological notions of life and the 
frightening evolutionary-materialist perspective appears most frequently in the musings of 
the The Last Man’s narrator, Lionel Verney.  Faced with the threat of death, Verney seems to 
engage in an intermittent internal dialogue with himself in which he attempts to comprehend 
the visible negation of his old theological assumptions to come to terms with the 
purposelessness and instability of organic nature that he sees everywhere around him.  
Initially, Verney reasons that divine Providence will not allow the extinction of humankind to 
plague:  
Yet we were not all to die.  No truly, though thinned, the race of man would 
continue, and the great plague would, in after years, become a matter of history and 
wonder…Look at [man’s] thought-endued countenance, his graceful limbs, his 
majestic brow, his wondrous mechanism—the type and model of this best work of 
God is not to be cast aside as a broken vessel—he shall be preserved, and his children 
and his children’s children carry down the name and form of man to latest time.103   
In the end, however, Verney puts aside such comforting ideas and accepts a more organic 
perspective, expressing his loss of assurance in humankind’s future and a new lack of faith in 
a divine plan. As the plague ravages the human population, Verney desperately notes: 
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A painful sense of the degradation of humanity, was introduced into every heart.  
Nature…shewed us plainly, that, though she permitted us to assign her laws and 
subdue her apparent powers, yet, if she put forth a finger, we must quake…Did God 
create man, merely in the end to become dead earth in the midst of healthful 
vegetating nature?  Was he of no more account to his Maker, than a field of corn 
blighted in the ear…Our name was written ‘a little lower than the angels;’ and, 
behold, we were no better than ephemera.104 
As in the previous passage, when Shelley’s novel mentions God, it is usually merely an 
attempt to reconcile traditional notions of a benevolent universe with the substantial natural 
evidence to the contrary. 
 The Last Man is also unique among Romantic apocalyptic narratives in anticipating 
later developments in evolutionary theory.  The narrator’s predictions of nature’s continued 
evolution and production of new complex, post-human species offers an example.  In one 
passage in the novel, Verney raises the possibility of “the unknown and unimaginable 
lineaments of the creatures, who would then occupy the vacated dwelling of mankind,” and 
in his recorded self-history, he warns his future readers, the “tender offspring of the re-born 
world” to beware of the implications of his woeful tale.105  In essence, Verney looks forward 
to new post-human species even as he mourns the death of his own. In anticipating a post-
human future occupied by an advanced, post-human species, The Last Man is a forerunner of 
later science fiction films. 
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Ontological Anxiety and Existential Despair in The Last Man  
In a strictly autobiographical sense, The Last Man’s preoccupation with death is 
likely related to the the fact that Shelley began writing the novel soon after Percy Shelley’s 
death, a time when she frequently—and painfully—reminisced about their stay at Lake 
Geneva in the summer of 1816.  For instance, in her preface to the 1831 edition of 
Frankenstein, Shelley writes about her tendency to dwell on that period in her life:  
I have an affection for it, for it was the offspring of happy days, when death and grief 
were but words, which found no true echo in my heart. Its several pages speak of 
many a walk, many a drive, and many a conversation, when I was not alone; and my 
companion was one who, in this world, I shall never see more. But this is for myself; 
my readers have nothing to do with these associations.106 
Whereas Frankenstein originated during a period “when death and grief were but words,” 
The Last Man seems to be Shelley’s attempt at a kind of catharsis of her grief over her 
husband’s—and children’s—deaths.  Yet despite this contextual difference, both novels share 
a number of significant ontological anxieties.   
One such anxiety in The Last Man emerges in passages in which Verney sharply 
juxtaposes life and death within the same paragraphs.  His vivid descriptions of moments of 
human liveliness in stark contrast to the specter of extinction that hangs over them 
emphasizes the paradoxical relationship between life and death as a disquieting feature of the 
human experience.  In the following passage, Verney relates a profound sense of the 
pervasiveness and inevitability of death that sabotages his joy at a group of dancers: 
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The band played . . . . its volatile notes gave wings to the feet of the dancers, while 
the lookers-on unconsciously beat time.  At first the tripping measure lifted my spirit  
[but] the revulsion of thought passed like keen steel to my heart.  Ye are all going to 
die, I thought; already your tomb is built up around you.  Awhile, you fancy that you 
live: but frail is the ‘bower of flesh’ that encaskets life . . . . The joyous sound . . . . 
will suddenly feel the axle-tree give way, and spring and steel dissolve in dust.  Not 
one of you, O fated crowd, can escape—not one! Not my own ones! Not my Idris and 
her babes!  Horror and misery!  Already the gay dance vanished, the green sward was 
swarmed with corpses, the blue air above became fetid with deathly exhalations . . . . 
I felt that [my friends and family] were all near, that they were safe, yet methought 
this was all deceit!107  
Verney’s explicit juxtaposition of two contrary states of being—his superimposition of the 
dancing scene with visions of death—crystallizes the disconcerting tension between the two.  
For while life and death are antithetical states, the certainty of death intrudes on life and 
gives Verney the feeling that those who are alive (and dance happily) are in a sense already 
dead. Torn between both perspectives, he finds that he cannot enjoy the dance or the 
company of his family, for in his mind he sees them as already condemned, nearly ghosts. 
Such literary “double consciousness” permeates The Last Man, much as it does Frankenstein.  
More than almost any other novel of its time, The Last Man incorporates explicit, 
grotesque depictions of the human body’s infections and decay. I would argue that this 
unusual explicitness confirms the novel’s investment in the notion of life and death as 
biological rather than spiritual processes.  Thus Mary Shelley moves away from comforting 
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biblical, spiritual, and societal interpretations of disease toward  materialist assessment 
infused with nausea and horror. In the following passage, Verney enters the house of a man 
afflicted with the plague and describes what he finds there: 
I soon arrived at the hut: the door was ajar.  I entered, and one glance assured me that 
its former inhabitant was no more—he lay on a heap of straw, cold and stiff; while a 
pernicious effluvia filled the room, and various stains and marks served to show the 
virulence of the disorder. I had never before beheld one killed by pestilence.  While 
every mind was full of dismay at its effects, a craving for excitement had led us to 
peruse De Foe’s account, and the masterly delineations of Arthur Mervyn.  The 
pictures drawn in these books were so vivid, that we seemed to have experienced the 
results depicted by them.  But cold were the sensations excited by words . . . . 
compared to what I felt in looking on the corpse of this unhappy stranger . . . . I raised 
his rigid limbs, I marked the distortion of his face, and the stony eyes lost to 
perception . . . . As I was thus occupied, chilled horror congealed my blood . . . . Half 
insanely I spoke to the dead.  So the plague killed you, I muttered.  Was the coming 
painful?  You look as if the enemy had tortured you, before he murdered you.108  
In relating the scent of the “pernicious effluvia” and the image of certain disgusting “stains 
and marks,” Mary Shelley provides for the reader an exceptionally vivid encounter with the 
horror of a natural process stripped of all comforting religious justifications or spiritual 
dimensions.  I would also call attention to the passage in which Verney describes the corpse’s 
“rigid” limbs and “distorted,” “cold” facial expression.  Such terms evoke a sense of dead 
matter, without a spiritual dimension.  The expressions she uses in this passage and others 
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reinforce a materialist perspective of life. The grotesque terminology employed in passages 
such as this irritated a number of contemporary critics, likely because of the disturbing 
implications they suggested.  
 In an autobiographical sense, it is likely that The Last Man’s focus on the grotesque, 
material aspect of life/death was also inspired in part by certain revolting aspects of Percy 
Shelley’s death and cremation in 1822. Edward Trelawny, one of those who recovered 
Shelley’s body from the wreckage and witnessed its cremation, later published the following 
description:  
[Shelley’s] body was soon uncovered. Lime had been strewn on it; this, or 
decomposition, had the effect of staining it of a dark and ghastly indigo colour. Byron 
asked me to preserve the skull for him; but remembering that he had formerly used 
one as a drinking-cup, I was determined Shelley's should not be so profaned. The 
limbs did not separate from the trunk, as in the case of [Edward] Williams's body, so 
that the corpse was removed entire into the furnace . . . The heat from the sun and fire 
was so intense that the atmosphere was tremulous and wavy. The corpse fell open and 
the heart was laid bare. The frontal bone of the skull, where it had been struck with 
the mattock, fell off; and, as the back of the head rested on the red-hot bottom bars of 
the furnace, the brains literally seethed, bubbled, and boiled as in a cauldron, for a 
very long time . . . The fire was so fierce as to produce a white heat on the iron, and to 
reduce its contents to grey ashes. The only portions that were not consumed were 
  
62
some fragments of bones, the jaw, and the skull, but what surprised us all was that the 
heart remained entire.109  
What is interesting about this passage is the grotesque details provided about the decay and 
degeneration of Shelley’s body.  Trelawny’s references to the body’s disintegration at sea 
during cremation provide a grim image of the material, corruptible aspect of biological life.  
(See Figure 5 for an artistic rendering of Shelley’s cremation.)  
 It is important to note that Mary Shelley did not witness the events Trelawny 
describes, as she was absent from the cremation.  I would also add that Trelawny’s account is 
notoriously suspect in the view of Shelley scholars, since he sought to advance his own 
public notoriety through its publication.110  However, even accounting for Trelawny’s 
exaggerations, Shelley’s death at sea and his cremation were traumatic experiences for his 
wife—a vivid reminder of the corruptible, material nature of human existence—and almost 
certainly the grotesque biological reality that underlies life and death.  
 
Apocalypse as Narrative Rupture: The Slice in The Last Man 
 The notion of apocalypse also functions in The Last Man as a prominent narrative 
rupture that occurs fairly late in the novel and destabilizes ontological categories of 
life/death, mind/body, spirit/matter, and biology/technology. I use the term narrative rupture 
to denote an abrupt change in a narrative that in some way unsettles the established plot, 
tone, and/or genre.  As I will explain, such a rupture results from the tensions between 
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theoretical categories symbolized by the slice, disrupting the ways in which ontological 
binaries function in the larger narrative structure. Narrative ruptures occur in The Last Man 
in the form of discordant plot elements intruding violently into a larger narrative structure. 
Some critics view them as evidence of an authorial deficiency, an inattention to required 
generic conventions or an inability to sustain a plotline to an appropriate conclusion.  One 
sees such disapproval in criticism of The Last Man that locates its “failure” in Shelley’s 
abandonment of the novel’s earlier  A common critique of this novel locates its “failure” in 
Shelley’s abandonment more than halfway through the book of the novel’s earlier 
Bildungsroman and romance genres in favor of a disaster-horror narrative. Whereas the first 
half of The Last Man methodically charts the course of its protagonist’s positive development 
from youth to adulthood and carefully develops two romantic subplots at the center of the 
novel, the new apocalyptic plague narrative quickly drops the prior narrative concerns as it 
narrows obsessively toward a single horrifying theme—the grotesque extinction of 
humankind by plague.  This discordant shift in tone, genre, and theme proves to be the 
primary stumbling block for many of the novel’s critics.   
Such a critique fails to understand that the narrative rupture is itself significant. The 
Last Man suggests that the threat of disturbance and negation always hides beneath 
supposedly stable symbolic orders.  If, as I have earlier suggested, Shelley’s apocalyptic 
narrative is preoccupied with the ways in which certain existential states are demarcated and 
categorized—that is, the ways in which they are symbolically ordered—the rupture of the 
novel’s plot with the introduction of the plague is an intentional depiction of the disruptive 
potential that threatens established symbolic orderings.111  
                                                 
111 Such an interpretation of the novel makes sense from a structuralist perspective.  Basic theoretical 
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The sudden outbreak of the plague disrupts this symbolic order, insomuch as death 
intrudes into and negates the narrative’s earlier structure founded upon themes of life, 
growth, and reproduction.  This disruption explains why the protagonist becomes acutely 
aware of the instability of existential categories after the plague emerges.  Lionel Verney’s 
frequent, obsessive ruminations on the intrusion of death into life and his chronic cognitive 
dissonance indicate the thoroughness of the plague’s disruption of the earlier developmental 
plot structure and symbolic ordering of life/death as distinct categories.  
 The Last Man’s apocalyptic storyline also negates the earlier idealism of the novel’s 
protagonists and their idealistic pursuits that structure the narrative.  Before the plague, 
Verney (modeled after Percy Shelley) evinces profoundly utopian notions about social 
progress, and the Byronic Lord Raymond is consumed with exaggerated desires for romance 
and heroism.  Yet the sudden intrusion of the plague destroys these motivations. 
(Significantly, the plague’s onset coincides with Raymond’s death, for both events cancel the 
protagonists’ idealistic pursuits.)  Moreover, the plague inverts the established trajectory for 
the Verney character: the former leader of human civilization ultimately becomes the witness 
of its annihilation.  The novel’s conclusion also inverts Verney’s transition from nature to 
civilization that occurs earlier in the narrative: his abandonment of his early uncultivated life 
                                                                                                                                                       
between a thing-concept and the name-classification assigned to it. And certain schools of 
psychoanalytic thought point to the unruly remainder that is foreclosed outside of any symbolic 
order—whether language, systems, laws, theories, or narratives.  Jacques Lacan described that 
element which is foreclosed (or excluded or repressed) by the symbolic order as a kind of remainder, 
which he names “the Real.” He uses this term because it implies an un-reality in the symbolic order; 
that is, no symbolic order is fully accurate because it always misses something.  For example, a name 
fails to convey the totality of that which it names, a law is unable to account for every nuance of 
actual social conditions, and a narrative cannot provide the entire essence of an experience or idea.  
This “lack” or gap in the symbolic order is the Real.111  The Real remains dormant until the moment 
at which it suddenly, violently erupts; when it erupts, it negates the established symbolic order.  The 
Real is by nature unpredictable, destructive, and irrational, and it represents a sort of Freudian return 
of the repressed. If we consider the sudden emergence of the plague in The Last Man as the return of 
what is elided in the novel’s initial narrative, then I would argue that it functions narratively as the 
Real. 
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in the wild for a place in enlightened society is reversed in the end to a lonely, primitive 
existence as the sole survivor of the end of civilization.   
 
Mary Shelley’s Non-Organicism: An Alternative View of Romanticism 
  The ruptures and dichotomies we find in works such as The Last Man and 
Frankenstein indicate a distinctive asyndeton—or juxtaposition without conjunction.  I 
would argue that the common use of this type of asyndeton in Romantic texts is significant 
because it contradicts the standard scholarly understanding of Romantic literature as 
fundamentally organic.  A number of scholars have asserted that continuity and symbiosis is 
the underlying structural form in Romantic literature, in which the parts of a work join 
seamlessly and “organically” to comprise a whole.112 And yet, I would argue that the stark 
dichotomies, ruptures, and asyndetons found in Frankenstein, The Last Man, and many other 
Romantic texts defy such an assumption, forcing us to re-evaluate notions of Romanticism as 
inherently organic.   
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Chapter Five 
 
Mary Shelley’s Legacy in the Twentieth Century: An Analysis of Correlative Themes in 
Popular Cinema 
 
 Mary Shelley’s overt influence on modern cinema started with James Whale’s 1931 
adaptation of Frankenstein, one of the American Film Institute’s hundred most influential 
movies of the twentieth century; its most famous line, “It’s alive! It’s alive!” ranks among the 
most famous quotations in cinema. 113  Whale’s film inspired numerous imitators, both 
directly—in the many sequels and remakes of Frankenstein—and indirectly—in shared 
motifs employed by films outside the Frankenstein sub-genre.  
 The first remake of the 1931 film was Bride of Frankenstein, released in 1935. The 
next sequel, 1939s Son of Frankenstein, was made, like all films that followed, without 
Whale. Several years later, Ghost of Frankenstein, was released; the fifth installment, 
Frankenstein Meets the Wolfman, was release in 1943 and was soon followed by House of 
Frankenstein in 1944. This trend continued for many years in the form of additional remakes 
and sequels, each one usually more outlandish than the last. Later Mel Brooks’s comedy 
Young Frankenstein parodied elements of the first three Frankenstein movies.  
 In Whale’s film, Heinrich “Henry” Frankenstein, an ardent young scientist, and his 
devoted assistant Fritz, a hunchback, piece together a human body, the parts of which have 
been secretly collected from various sources. Frankenstein’s consuming desire is to create 
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human life through various electrical devices which he has perfected. Elizabeth and Dr. 
Waldman, intent on rescuing Frankenstein, arrive just as Henry is making his final test. They 
all watch Frankenstein and the hunchback as they raise the dead creature on an operating 
table, high into the room, toward an opening at the top of the laboratory. Then, after a crash 
of thunder, the hands of Frakenstein’s monster (the famous Boris Karloff) begin to move. 
This causes Frankenstein to shout, “It’s alive!” The monster soon escapes from Frankenstein 
only to be persecuted by those villagers he encounters along the way. 
 Whale’s original film begins with Edward Van Sloan stepping from behind a curtain 
and delivering a brief caution and also a tease: 
Hello. Mr. Carl Lammele has asked me to give you just a friendly word of warning. 
We are about to unfold the story of Frankenstein, a man of science who sought to 
create a man after his own image without reckoning on God. It is one of the strangest 
tales ever told. It deals with two great mysteries of creation; life and death. I think it 
will thrill you. It may shock you. It might even horrify you. So, if any of you feel that 
you do not care to subject your nerves to such a strain, now’s your chance to uh, 
well—we warned you!! 
This opening monologue foregrounds the film’s themes—a fear of technological innovation, 
anxieties about human identity, and the relationship between life and death. In fact, this 
monologue juxtaposes life and death beside each other in the same sentence, indicating an 
awareness of the kinds of ontological tensions functioning within Shelley’s narrative. While 
Shelley scholarship has almost entirely focused on only the films explicitly inspired by 
Frankenstein—starting with James Whale’s version and continuing through numerous 
remakes, sequels, and adaptations of the novel—I will avoid retreading this ground, 
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examining instead films not explicitly linked to Shelley’s novels yet recognizably 
symptomatic of the same themes explored in her classic narrative.114 
 
Ontological Anxiety and the Frankenstein “Mad Science” Narrative Re-Imagined in 
The Fly 
 One of the most successful “mad-scientist” films to follow Whale’s Frankenstein was 
a 1958 horror B-movie directed by Kurt Neumann entitled The Fly, which starred Vincent 
Price as an ambitious scientist who develops a machine capable of instantaneously 
transporting a person from one location to another via the rapid molecular breakdown and 
reassembly of the body.115 Price’s character finds himself fused with a fly when he 
inadvertently allows a fly into the device, transporting both the insect and himself into a 
single chamber. The computer instantly combines the two lifeforms into a single monstrous 
organism. 
 The Fly clearly borrows from Mary Shelley’s narrative. Like Frankentein, The Fly 
focuses on an eccentric scientist in pursuit of ethically questionable scientific achievement. 
In the course of his experiments, he produces a monster; interestingly, The Fly fuses creature 
and creator into one person, complicating the ontological questions raised in Frankenstein. 
Another important thematic correlation between the two works is their emphasis on the 
grotesque material aspect of life. In fact, the horror of the film’s concept lies in its combining 
of a human with an insect—one of the most repulsive and primitive of nature’s creatures. 
                                                 
114 For an overview of scholarship on Whale’s Frankenstein, see James Curtis, James Whale: 
A New World of Gods and Monsters (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), pp. 
7-14. 
 
115 Kurt Neumann, The Fly (1958: Los Angeles: MGM), DVD: Warner Brothers,  1992. 
  
69
 Modern audiences today find The Fly to be a humorous example of 1950s sci-
fi/horror. However, a 1986 remake also title The Fly and directed by David Cronenberg 
transforms the amusing 1950s premise into a grotesque bio-horror narrative, one that exploits 
modern anxieties about disease and mortality along with fears about gene splicing and 
technological advancements.116 Cronenberg’s version depicts, with great emphasis on 
abjection, the gradual transformation of a scientist, Seth Brundle, into a 185-pound  fly, 
which he cynically names Brundlefly. As in the original film, the fusion of man and fly at the 
molecular level results from a botched transporter experiment, in which Brundle 
unknowingly transports himself and the fly simultaneously, forcing the computer to fuse 
them at the molecular level. After transportation, Brundle emerges from the pod, unaware 
that the computer has spliced his DNA with that of the fly. Over a period of weeks, he 
gradually metamorphoses into a fly. 
 Critics interpret Cronenberg’s film as concerned primarily with monstrosity.117 
Cronenberg’s films tend to upset ontological distinctions, featuring disturbing depicts of the 
human body in various states of mutation, decay, and/or disease. For this reason, his films are 
often categorized as bio-horror, a genre that I have shown began with Frankenstein and 
continued with The Last Man. Cronenberg’s focus on the body is oriented toward arousing 
discomfort and disgust in the audience, as well as a greater appreciation for the biological 
foundation underlying supposedly civilized society.  In Adam Smith’s 2003 documentary 
The American Nightmare, Cronenberg explains his reasoning: 
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You don’t get society without the body, and you don’t get body without society. I 
guess I insist on returning to the body, because I feel that so much of human culture is 
an attempt to flee the body. That we do not want to be disembodied. To not 
acknowledge it. To not deal with it. Really to not place it at the center of our reality. 
But I think that it is.118 
Cronenberg’s films thus each highlight a particular aspect of the animal or biological body: 
that under certain conditions, often those of illness, the biological body is repositioned as 
problematic and threatening. As Cronenberg says, “Humans are bodies, and our failure to 
acknowledge that is often our fatal flaw.”119 Cronenberg’s films also critique those who only 
acknowledge the body by celebrating it—depicting the way in which in a bodily breakdown, 
the joy of embracing the body is replaced by pain, uncertainty, and incapacity. It is these 
unusual conditions of embodiment in which Cronenberg is interested. 
 Many have taken his version of The Fly to be a commentary on the AIDS epidemic, 
which attracted much attention in the 1980s. However, the symptoms depicted might also 
represent cancer: Brundle’s disease is the result of a genetic mutation, and there are several 
references to cancer in the film. For instance, when Brundle tells his love about his illness, he 
says, “I think it’s showing itself as a bizarre form of cancer, a general cellular cancer.” (I 
would suggest that The Fly is one of the most complete cinematic portrayals of a cancerous 
process, from mutation to death, in all its tragic horror.) In either case, the film can be read as 
a phenomenological study of illness, depicting in minute detail the changes illness brings 
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about. Cinema is a powerful tool for portraying illness as a multidimensional process. (This 
transformation, so perfectly captured by cinematic language, is entirely overlooked in other 
representational forms depicting illness, most notably in medical vocabulary.) 
 What is at stake in the case of illness? Maurice Merleau-Ponty cites instances of 
bodily disorder to uncover the ambiguity of the “body as lived” (consciousness) and the 
“body as biological.”120 The natural ease of everyday physical life often elides this 
ontological split. By turning to pathological cases, Merleau-Ponty illustrates the tension 
between the two (mind vs. body). Along these lines, Cronenberg depicts Brundle’s biological 
body rapidly changing and hence splitting from his lived experience. His familiar, lived body 
afforded him a familiar set of capacities, but these are now replaced by uncanny capacities 
and—worse—incapacities. What we see in the film is Brundle’s habitual body peeled way 
from its biological “body at this moment,” and how he copes with the new challenges 
presented by his transformation. 121 This is the alienation and sense of being not at home in 
one’s own body and exposes the tension between ontological categories. 
 In depicting Brundle’s physical degeneration in The Fly, Cronenberg features 
excessive gore to render the film grotesque. Brundle is a tidy scientist, but his transformation 
makes him physically repulsive—he vomits digestive acid on himself, his face is blotchy, 
pieces of his body fall off, his hands—the emblem of humanity—are replaced by insect legs, 
and so on. When he first begins to change, his lover Roni confronts him by noting, “You’re 
changing, Seth. Everything about you is changing. You look bad. You smell bad.”122 
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Cronenberg uses visual effects to maximum effect: one of Brundle’s ears falls off, he 
repeatedly vomits on his food, and he develop wings from within his abdomen. Finally his 
skin splits open and he sheds, the full insect form appearing.  What is compelling about these 
changes is that they are ontologically destabilizing. 
 The betrayal of the flesh, the frailty of the body, the ephemeral nature of health and 
youth are invoked in the horror scenes in the form of a kind of promise—that decay and 
degeneration are the fate of all human bodies. This emphasis on grotesque biology and 
physical decay reinforces a materialist perspective of life and echoes the themes expressed in 
Frankenstein and The Last Man.  And like those novels, Cronenberg’s film also avoids 
religion in favor of a determinist understanding of consciousness, dismissing the possibility 
of a soul and instead locating identity or “mind” solely in the physical brain. Just as the 
Creature’s identity in Frankenstein is determined by his physical components, in The Fly 
Brundle’s personality is determined by biology. For example, midway through his 
metamorphosis, he warns Roni that he is acquiring an insect’s psychological nature. The 
following excerpt expresses this determinist notion: 
 Brundle: You need to leave here and never come back. 
 Roni:     Why? 
 Brundle: Have you ever heard of insect politics? 
 Roni:      [stares blankly] 
 Brundle: Neither have I. Insects don’t have politics. The insect is brutal. 
 Roni:      I don’t know what you’re saying. 
 Brundle: I’m saying…I’ll hurt you if you stay. 
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This dialogue emphasizes biology and and supports the view of identity as determined by the 
physical body rather than a psyche or mind separate from the body. Despite watching the 
horror of Brundle’s transformation, the viewer cannot walk away from it and is instead 
locked into the camera, which depicts Brundle in his most intimate moments. In an early 
scene, the film depicts Brundle in his bathroom, removing his fingernails as fluid oozes out 
of his fingers. Startled, he asks in horror, “Am I dying? Is this how it starts?” This scene in 
the most intimate of rooms, the bathroom, violates our usual sense that bathroom activities 
should not be witnessed by anyone. The viewer is there with Brundle as a forced spectator. 
This violation of bathroom policy continues when Brundle loses his teeth, which he places in 
a bathroom cabinet along with other “relics” of his former body.  The viewer is there, too, 
forced to witness Brundle’s physical decay in an almost clautrophobic experience. The 
viewer thus vicariously shares the sensation of being unable to escape one’s own pain and 
predicament—the central feature of illness. Whereas the others can choose whether to stay or 
leave, the ill person is trapped within the body and locked into a process of degeneration. 
Cronenberg himself said the film is about aging and death, about the universal process of 
growing old and dysfunctional.123 It is the inevitability of illness and decay that is the source 
of the horror. 
 Another interesting theme in The Fly is its focus on the tension between the 
ontological categories of health vs. illness. Normally the two states—health and illness, or 
human and monster—are posited as mutually exclusive. Instead of accepting the dichotomy, 
Cronenberg seems to problematize it, showing that ultimately we all have “the disease of 
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being finite.”124 The film initially dupes the viewer into accepting the human/monster and 
healthy/diseased dichotomies, then reveals their illusoriness. If change is the condition of 
organic life, the film’s general conclusion is that no one is exempt from processes of illness, 
aging, and ultimately dying: disintegration and decay are the inevitable endpoint of human 
trajectory. For this reason, the dichotomy between healthy and diseased, which seems so 
prominent in the film, is a false distinction. One is only temporarily healthy, and the 
difference between health and illness is only one of degree. Thus Brundle’s transformation, 
superficially a unique and monstrous one, is in fact only an instance of universal organic 
change. As Cronenberg says, “We are used to our bodies changing. First we grow up, then 
we grow down. There’s only a moment where there are a few years of an illusion of stability. 
It doesn’t last long.”125 We all metamorphose, only at a slower rate. 
 The gradual transformation of a normal human body takes place over many decades 
and is therefore experienced as unthreatening, but the changes experienced by Brundle are 
sudden and therefore extraordinary. Late into his transformation, Brundle remarks, “Every 
time I look in the mirror there’s someone different, someone hideous, someone repulsive.” In 
The Arist as Monster, William Beard argues that The Fly explores human identity and the 
factors that threaten it. Mutation, disease, and abjection are subjected to an intense 
examination, focusing on the question: what constitutes a human subject and what constitutes 
a monster? This investigation, says Beard, requires a fully realized subject to be erased. This 
subjectivity must first be established so we can fully appreciate the loss. The film’s project is 
to observe the utter destruction of the human subject by forces of inconceivable otherness. I 
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would add that the film questions and problematizes the notion of the human in relation to 
the animal. As Brundle becomes more fly-like, he loses his human features and there some of 
his human subjectivity. 
 One striking similarity between Cronenberg’s film and Frankenstein is their shared 
emphasis on reproductive anxiety. In The Fly, Brundle’s girlfriend Roni becomes pregnant 
(prior to the apparent stages of Brundle’s metamorphosis), and, fearing that the fetus might 
be infected with his disease, seeks an abortion. In Chapter Two, I discussed the significance 
of the fetus as occupying the same contested position as the Creature (neither fully alive nor 
dead). In The Fly, the inclusion of pregnancy and abortion indicates the film’s similar interest 
in indeterminate ontological categories.  Additionally, like Frankenstein, The Fly expresses 
an anxiety about modern technology’s intrusion into biological processes 
(technology/nature). Brundle’s invention and its consequences suggest scientific fields such 
as genetic engineering and gene splicing.  Opponents of such research fear that “monsters” 
might result, and Cronenberg’s film depicts just such an outcome, especially toward the end 
of the film: searching for a cure for his malady, Brundle consults the computer, which tells 
him that in order to counteract his metamorphosis into an insect, he must fuse his genes with 
those of another human. He therefore wishes to fuse himself with his pregnant girlfriend 
Roni in order to make what he mockingly calls, “the perfect family.” At the last minute, 
Roni’s ex-boyfriend arrives to rescue her—shooting the cable that connects Roni’s 
teleportation pod to the computer. The computer then fuses Brundle with part of the telepod 
itself, creating a monstrous fusion of man, fly, and metal—human, insect, and inanimate 
object. This new monster slowly crawls out of the pod, metal pieces and cables trailing 
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behind it, only to be shot in the final scene. The film’s cynical conclusion can be read as a 
warning about the monstrosities produced by modern science.  
 
Identity, Infection, and Apocalypse in Invasion of the Body Snatchers 
 Invasion of the Body Snatchers is a 1956 American science fiction film directed by 
Don Siegel and adapted from a 1954 novel by Jack Finney entitled simply The Body 
Snatchers. The story depicts an extraterrestrial invasion in a small California town. The 
invaders replace human beings with duplicates that appear identical but are devoid of any 
emotion or individuality. A local doctor uncovers what is happening and tries to stop them. 
The film has been remade twice, in 1978 by Daniel Kaufman and in 1999 by Olivier 
Hierspiel. 
 “Body-snatching” has long been restricted to the meaning of a secret exhumation of 
bodies from a grave or a tomb for the purpose of dissection or anatomical study. Body-
snatching is distinct from grave robbery because body-snatchers leave anything of value 
behind, aside from the corpse itself. This film updates the term to designate stealing the 
victim’s body while he or she is still alive. The novel’s original title The Body Snatchers has 
been changed in recent editions to Invasion of the Body Snatchers, likely to ally it with the 
1956 and 1978 films; however, this change obfuscates a reading of the title that draws a 
comparison between the pod people of the story and those—like Victor Frankenstein—who 
steal corpses from the ground. 
 “Pod people,” as seen in the various versions, are the emotionless walking dead. This 
lack of emotion offers benefits (such as an end to violence) but creates an ontological 
emptiness that renders the aliens seemingly devoid of  subjectivity. Note the emotional 
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vacancy referenced in this quotation from one of the pod people in the 1956 version: “Your 
new bodies are growing in there. They're taking you over cell for cell, atom for atom. There 
is no pain. Suddenly, while you're asleep, they'll absorb your minds, your memories and 
you're reborn into an untroubled world...Tomorrow you'll be one of us...There's no need for 
love…Love. Desire. Ambition. Faith. Without them, life is so simple, believe me.” And in 
another scene from the same film, we see a reference to the death of the soul and the 
description of empty, shell-like bodies: 
A moment's sleep, and the girl I loved was an inhuman enemy bent on my 
destruction. That moment's sleep was death to Becky's soul, just as it had been for 
Jack and Teddy and Dan Kauffman and all the rest. Their bodies were now hosts 
harboring an alien form of life; a cosmic form, which to survive must take over every 
human man! 
I would suggest that the film’s stress on the soul and on empty bodies points to an anxiety 
about identity and whether it is composed of spirit or merely body (matter/spirit), as well as 
an anxiety about the relationship between the mind and the body (mind/body).  
 The final shots of Kaufman’s 1978 film emphasize these ontological themes about 
identity and the nature of consciousness. The protagonist Matthew appears as though none of 
the events in the film have happened.  The audience presumes that he is performing, going 
through his daily motions, in order to avoid discovery by the pod people around him. In his 
workplace, his lab-coated coworkers appear emotionless. They operate machinery, but then 
again, it appears that the machinery operates them. One close-up shows a character slowly 
rotating her head toward a bubbling vase, reaching for a dial, turning it, and watching as a 
motor inside the vase spins down. Everything moves in an expected, robotic way, as though 
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the world were highly orderly. The lab workers do not resemble each other physically, but 
their expressions and gestures are uniform. When they walk out of the building later in the 
scene, there is a sequence of shots that depicts them walking home mechanically. 
 The film concludes with an iconic image of Matthew standing before the capitol 
building in San Francisco, where the film is set. The colors are cold and muted, unlike the 
hyper-saturated color we see elsewhere in the film. He is approached by another character 
named Nancy—one of the few surviving humans to remain undetected—looking markedly 
different from earlier scenes, a businesswoman in white with her hair bound in tight coils. 
Now she is dressed in a red bohemian outfit with her hair loose, as though she has recently 
come alive. Nancy’s liveliness is incongruous with the scene surrounding her—incongruous 
with the patchy grass, the dead trees, and the grey pavement—suggesting that anything 
resembling life has withdrawn from the world. As Nancy approaches Matthew, the smile on 
her face morphs into an expression of panic.  With very little movement, Matthew raises his 
arm, points at her, tilts his head back, and widens his mouth in a silent scream, given voice 
by a shrill dubbed screen on the soundtrack. Matthew’s scream is the most disturbing gesture 
that occurs in the various Body Snatchers films. The film ends with a freeze-frame on 
Matthew’s face that zooms in quickly upon his mouth, which is essentially a hollow, 
frightening maw. The camera zooms entirely inside his mouth, and the audience, in a dark 
theater, is presented with an image of vacancy and ontological negation as the credits begin 
to roll.  
 Oliver Hierspiel’s 1999 version Invasion also emphasizes this sense of psychological 
vacancy, but in a different way. There is a brief but significant shot of the protagonist Carol 
approaching an escalator. She walks methodically, her posture stiff, and her face 
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expressionless. With a fixed gaze, she rides the escalator, and the escalator lends the scene a 
sense of monotony in motion and of a mechanized lifelessness.  
 Hierspiel’s film also depicts anxieties about the nature of human identity in its focus 
on human violence and the question of human animality. The film’s characters debate this 
ontological question: 
Yorish: I say that civilization is an illusion, a game of pretend. What is real is the fact 
that we are still animals, driven by primal instincts. As a psychiatrist, you must know 
this to be true. 
Carol: To be honest, ambassador, when someone starts talking to me about the truth, 
what I hear is what they're telling me about themselves more than what they're saying 
about the world. 
Dr. Henryk Belicec: Quite right, well done, doctor. 
Yorish: Perhaps this is true, perhaps being a Russian in this country is a kind of 
pathology. So what do you think, can you help me? Can you give me a pill? To make 
me see the world the way you Americans see the world. Can a pill help me 
understand Iraq, or Dafur, or even New Orleans? All I am saying is that civilization 
crumbles whenever we need it most. In the right situation, we are all capable of the 
most terrible crimes. To imagine a world where this was not so, where every crisis 
did not result in new atrocities, where every newspaper is not full of war and 
violence. Well, this is to imagine a world where human beings cease to be human. 
 
Carol: While I'll give you that we still retain some basic animal instincts, you have to 
admit we're not the same animal we were a few thousand years ago. 
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Yorish: True. 
This debate not only explores the question of human identity (human/inhuman) but also 
implies (with Yorish’s reference to pharmaceuticals) that the psyche is simply a material 
mechanism governed by biology.  
 If the Body Snatchers films explore ontological anxieties reminiscent of Frankentein, 
their depiction of worldwide apocalypse, the threat of human extinction, and a final 
uninfected human all connect them thematically with The Last Man. In addition, the Body 
Snatchers films depict the “invasion” as an infection that spreads as an epidemic, recalling 
the plague in Shelley’s narrative. The following quote from the 1956 version exemplifies this 
motif:  
Less than a month ago, Santa Mira was like any other town. People with nothing but 
problems. Then, out of the sky came a solution. Seeds drifting through space for years 
took root in a farmer's field. From the seeds came pods which had the power to 
reproduce themselves in the exact likeness of any form of life . . . Maybe they’re the 
result of some weird alien organism—a virus of some kind. 
This emphasis on virality and infection is also highlighted in Hierspiel’s film, in which the 
pod people infiltrate society by initiating a worldwide innoculation program that serves to 
transmit the alien disease. 
Epidemic and Apocalypse in Night of the Living Dead 
 Shot in black-and-white over seven months on a shoestring budget, George Romero’s 
Night of the Living Dead defined the modern horror movie and influenced a number of horror 
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directors.126 The The Fly and Invasion of the Body Snatchers, it explores many of the themes 
with which Frankenstein and The Last Man are concerned.  The film’s plot is simple: 
Barbara and her brother Johnny are attacked when visiting their father’s grave, Johnny is 
killed by a zombie. Fleeing her attacker, Barbara flees to a nearby farmhouse and joins others 
who attempt to survive a zombie siege.  The films ends with the deaths of all in the house. 
 Depicting the zombie apocalypse as the result of a biological infection, the film offers 
a B-movie scientific explanation of the zombie outbreak’s origin: radiation from outer space. 
Romero thus evokes contemporary fears about nuclear warfare common at the time (given 
that the Cuban Missile Crisis was a fairy recent memory). The wretched condition of 
Romero’s zombies resounds with popular fantasies about the aftermath of a nuclear attack on 
America—a widespread anxiety underpinning American post-war cinema, also evident in 
Franklin Schaffner’s Planet of the Apes. Romero’s film also evokes the religious doomsday 
embraced by fundamentalist Christians who believe in the eventual resurrection of the dead. 
 However, Romero does not posit anxiety about nuclear technology as the only correct 
interpretation of the apocalypse; instead, he prefers to let the audience determine the meaning 
of his metaphor. Horror films are to borrow a term from the novelist Umberto Eco, “open 
works,” texts that allow a high degree of interpretive ambiguity.127 Eco argues that such texts 
best suit our own time because they reflect the sense of disorder and discontinuity that vexes 
the modern world. In every era, the Night of the Living Dead audience attaches its own 
meanings to the zombies. Romero allows his metaphor to work subtly yet powerfully at the 
                                                 
126 George Romero, Night of the Living Dead (1968: Los Angeles: MGM Studios), DVD: 
MGM Studios,  1991. 
 
127 Umberto Eco, The Open Work (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989). 
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heart of his film; his primary interest is not in providing a detailed explanation of the disaster 
so much as in analyzing the human response to it. 
 Night of the Living Dead is a film about apocalypse, a topic which has enjoyed a 
surge in popularity since the 1950s. The cultural critic Slavoj !i"ek observes that Americans 
have a deep psychological attachment to images of catastrophe, which he attributes to fear of 
radical social change and a desire to preserve the status quo.128 While many mainstream 
American films concern some kind of catastrophe, however, Night of the Living Dead does 
not offer the optimistic narrative closure expected of the Hollywood disaster movie. Instead, 
Romero presents a tragedy in which the hero dies.  Moreover, the tragic vision has a 
distinctly political coloring. 
 Whereas !i"ek’s theories about catastrophe grow out of his analysis of American 
responses to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Night of the Living Dead must be 
understood in relation to the impact of the Vietnam War on American consciousness in the 
1960s. In the opening shot of Johnny and Barbara’s car entering the graveyard, we see a 
fluttering American flag in the foreground. The symbolism of the flag becomes clear as the 
film progresses. However, by the late 1960s, such patriotic hegemony had been significantly 
contested and undermined. Romero’s film emerged at a time of strong public disapproval of 
American military involvement in Vietnam, during which criticisms of patriotism occurred 
frequently. Popular culture scholar John Fiske writes, “It is not violence per se that 
characterizes popular culture, but only that violence whose structure makes it into a metaphor 
for the distribution of power in socety.”129  
                                                 
128 Slavoj !i"ek, Psychoanalysis and Popular Culture (New York: Verso Press, 2010). 
 
129 John Fiske, Understanding Popular Culture (New York: Routledge, 1989), p. 123. 
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 Like Invasion of the Body Snatchers, Night of the Living Dead problematizes what it 
means to be a human being and dramatizes the terror of alienation. The film’s power to 
unsettle its audience also derives from its focus on the taboo subject of cannibalism (which it 
depicts far more graphically than previous zombie films.) In the eighteenth century, the 
British media circulated reports of French cannibalism by revolutionary crowds. Night of the 
Living Dead similarly uses cannibalism to dramatize power relations and social upheaval. 
The zombies are frenzied in their cannibalism. Meanwhile, the humans barricade themselves 
inside a house and spend the entire film arguing with each other and policing the boundaries 
of the house. The zombies in Romero’s films always manage to break through. 
 “We are the living dead,” Romero says in The American Nightmare, and his 
sentiment is echoed in the recent resurgence of zombie films.130 In Shaun of the Dead (2004), 
for example, the zombies become nearly indistinguishable from the living, the mechanical 
monotony of the humans  and zombies echoing the key visual signal of the Body Snatchers 
films. Some argue that humans are at a point in thei evolution where technology has 
compromised our human nature—not quite living and not quite dead. 
 It is these modern anxieties about technology, identity, and apocalypse that underlie 
the narratives of a number of twentieth-century films. Viewed from this perspective, they 
suggest the strong influence of Mary Shelley’s novels in later popular culture.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
130 Simon, The American Nightmare.  
  
84
 
 
 
Chapter Six 
 
Mary Shelley’s Post-Millenium Legacy: The Film and Television Works of Danny Boyle 
and Frank Darabont 
 
One of the basic conventions of the modern zombie film—including the first and 
best-known zombie film, George Romero’s Night of the Living Dead—is that killing a 
zombie requires inflicting a fatal injury to its head.131 Modern scholarship on zombie films 
commonly notes that this imperative to destroy the zombie brain (rather than other important 
organs such as the heart) is ubiquitous in zombie films.132 Significantly, such a narrative 
requirement confines the locus of existence to the head and suggests a categorical and 
existential split between the head (or mind) and the body.  This bifurcated paradigm is the 
same perspective suggested by the guillotine executions of revolutionary France, which 
focused the observer’s attention on the act of separating head and body and generated anxiety 
about whether consciousness could continue after decapitation—therefore implying the 
mind’s ability to function apart from the body (at least for a little while).  It is this 
perspective of a distinction between mind and body that lies at root of the anxieties generated 
                                                 
131 George Romero, Night of the Living Dead (1968: Los Angeles, CA: Image Ten), DVD: 
2001.  
 
132 See Deborah Christie and Sarah Juliet Lauro, Better Off Dead: The Evolution of the 
Zombie as Post-Human (New York: Fordham University Press, 2011), William Bishop, 
American Zombie Gothic: The Rise and Fall (And Rise) of the Walking Dead in Popular 
Culture (New York: McFarland, 2010), and Stephanie Boluk, Generation Zombie: Essays on 
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by guillotine executions and zombie films alike.  It is no wonder, then, that zombie films—
which by definition explore modern fears about existential categories—require the 
destruction of the zombie’s head.   
One of the most highly acclaimed zombie films, Danny Boyle’s 28 Days Later, 
emphasizes this mind/body split by depicting decapitation by blade as the preferred method 
for executing zombies.133  Whereas some zombie films feature guns as the primary defensive 
tools, the protagonists of Boyle’s film exclusively employ a machete to decapitate the 
undead, despite the unconventionality and practical inferiority of such a method in 
comparison to firearm execution.134 In utilizing this motif of the slice, Boyle draws more 
deeply upon the same kinds of anxieties elicited by guillotine execution—the sense that 
existence is localized in the mind and, moreover, that the mind is somehow categorically and 
existentially distinct from the body.  And yet, as explained earlier, the machete carries its 
own set of anxieties about primitivism, “darker” ethnicities, and societal apocalypse.  
Perhaps the machete’s association with postcolonial anxieties over slave revolts explains why 
in zombie films like 28 Days Later and the popular tv show The Walking Dead, machetes 
and machete-like weapons are most often associated with characters of African ancestry.   
 In regard to larger ontological anxieties, 28 Days Later expresses thematic 
preoccupations similar to those found in Frankenstein: just as Mary Shelley’s narrative 
evinces a materialist perspective and references the paradoxical relationship between life and 
death, 28 Days Later depicts zombies who are technically alive—in the most basic biological 
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sense—but not alive in the traditional, spiritual sense. Boyle’s film begins with the outbreak 
of a “rage virus” that changes those infected into ravenous “undead.”  Very  
soon, the spread of the virus reaches epidemic proportions, effecting an apocalyptic collapse 
of modern society.  The film then narrows its focus to a single protagonist who awakens from 
a coma in a London hospital to find that the world around him has collapsed. He joins a small 
group of survivors as they leave London to search for a safer community—eventually finding 
a makeshift military camp protected by a group of traumatized British soldiers.  At this point, 
the plot takes a turn similar to Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, but the zombie threat 
remains a key plot element through the film’s conclusion. 
As corpses brought to life by a virus developed in a lab, the zombies in 28 Days Later 
lack anything more than a minimal consciousness and therefore paradoxically inhabit the 
categories of both life and death in an uneasy fashion—they are simultaneously alive and 
dead and yet do not occupy either category fully.  As creatures occupying a liminal space 
between seemingly distinct categories, the zombies in Boyle’s film are akin to the Creature in 
Shelley’s novel (despite the Creature’s greater cognitive ability).  Additionally, like 
Frankenstein, 28 Days Later depicts consciousness and identity as strictly material rather 
than spiritual in nature.  Just as the Creature’s consciousness is not viewed as emanating from 
a “soul” but merely as a physically animated brain, the zombies in Boyle’s film result from a 
virus that affects the brains of living people, changing them into aggressive, minimally 
cognizant animals.  Therefore, identity in 28 Days Later is a strictly biological matter since it 
can be altered entirely by the “rage virus” that turns normal humans into ravenous murderers. 
As does Shelley’s novel, 28 Days Later promotes the notion of consciousness-as-brain and 
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contradicts the notion of the mind/body split, for it depicts the mind as synonymous with 
body, not distinct from it.  
One of the key elements of all zombie movies is the abrupt shift in personality and 
behavior that results from a character’s transformation from human to zombie.  The greatest 
horror in a zombie film comes not from the death of a character but the instantaneous 
negation of a character’s prior identity as he/she transforms into a zombie. This motif, 
ubiquitous within the zombie-film genre, implies an entirely materialist (mind-as-matter) 
perspective and elicits the viewer’s horror over the susceptibility of identity and behavior to 
biological factors.  That is, the zombie film “works” artistically by exploiting a fear that the 
human psyche is entirely biologically determined.135 
One particular scene in 28 Days Later that best depicts this materialist anxiety occurs 
toward the end of the film when the character John Reilly suddenly becomes infected with 
the virus and immediately transforms into a zombie. Prior to his transformation, the film 
presents him as utterly human, a noble character who enjoys a very close bond with his 
adolescent daughter and shields her from the grim apocalyptic reality around them.  Toward 
the end of the film, however, he is unintentionally infected by a single drop of contaminated 
blood and immediately realizes the implications of this accident: in the seconds between 
infection and transformation, he gazes at his daughter with a loving but mournful expression 
and assures her of his feelings for her even as he warns her to keep her distance from him. At 
these last words, he convulses violently as his features contort and his eyes turn bloodshot. In 
an instant, the daughter he loved a mere second ago becomes the object of his predation: he 
charges at her with an animal-like growl, and another character must decapitate him to 
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prevent him from cannibalizing her.  The horror in such a scene lies precisely in this dramatic 
shift—the abrupt negation of a prior identity and its replacement with an entirely different, 
grotesque one (that is, the horror of mind as mere matter). Just as in Frankenstein a spiritual 
dimension is absent in Victor’s musings on life and his consideration of the Creature, so too 
does 28 Days Later lack any suggestion of any non-material, spiritual dimension to 
existence: identity and behavior are entirely biologically determined. Moreover, the 
thoughtlessness with which the film’s protagonists kill the zombies and the utter absence of 
any sentimentality in their attitude toward them further reinforces the sense that the infected 
have no souls to respect, no dimension beyond the biological one to consider.   
28 Days Later also suggests a paradoxical relationship between the categories of life 
and death, teasing its viewers by positioning then challenging a firm boundary between these 
oppositional states: like the Creature in Shelley’s novel, the zombies in 28 Days Later 
occupy a space between traditional ontological categories. Despite the fact that the zombies 
in Boyle’s film are not actually dead but are merely infected with a virus, they lose all claim 
to human status after infection. And just as the Creature in Shelley’s story occupies a 
marginalized position as alive and yet also inhuman,136 so too do the monstrous creatures in 
Boyle’s film stand outside of distinct classification.  The film emphasizes this sense of an 
indeterminate state between life and death in a scene in which a character exploits a captured 
zombie for a starvation experiment: rather than mercifully killing the zombie, its captor keeps 
it a prisoner to observe the effects of the starvation process. The moral implications of this 
act remain unquestioned by the other characters, since—like Victor’s Creature—the zombie 
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is not regarded as a legitimate life even if it is technically alive; thus, both the Creature and 
the zombie exist within the metaphorical slice that both divides and joins the categories of 
life and death.  Alive and dead and yet fully neither, the Creature and the zombie are trapped 
within the cut where seemingly distinct categories paradoxically bleed into one another. 
The tension between categories depicted in 28 Days Later is a major component of 
Danny Boyle’s other sci-fi/horror film, Sunshine.137  A futuristic narrative centering on the 
threat of human extinction, Sunshine portrays a team of astronauts on board Icarus II, 
engaged in a suicide mission to detonate a bomb within the sun, thereby reversing its 
degeneration and safeguarding humanity’s future.  Probably alluding to Shelley’s apocalyptic 
novel, Boyle’s film names its Mary-Shelleyan antecedent when Icarus II’s Captain Pinbacker 
declares himself  “the Last Man.” Similarly to Shelley’s novel, the film concerns itself with 
existential questions on both a macro and micro level, as the threat of impending extinction 
forces a kind of cognitive dissonance on the film’s central characters:  alive and yet doomed 
to a certain death (either through the completion of their suicide mission or through species 
extinction if their mission fails), they exist on the boundary between opposite existential 
states (life/death). Yet this is not the only metaphorical slice Boyle investigates—his film 
also explores the dichotomy of spirit/matter.  Like The Last Man, Sunshine’s narrative clearly 
suggests the materiality and ephemerality of existence (life-as-mere-matter).  However, 
Boyle ultimately diverges from Shelley’s grim materialism with a hopeful conclusion that 
evokes a sense of spiritual transcendence.   
Despite this uplifting conclusion, the greater part of Sunshine’s narrative is fueled by 
an underlying existential anxiety about the characters’ indeterminate status as alive and yet 
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condemned to a certain death. It is the tension within the life/death binary that supplies the 
film’s central anxiety: always juxtaposed uncomfortably against the astronauts’ larger 
mission to save humanity is the certainty of their impending individual deaths.  Through the 
entirety of their voyage to the center of the sun, the crew struggles with this cognitive 
dissonance, continually repressing the horror of their own fate beneath their dedication to the 
continued survival of the greater human species.  One character in particular—Captain 
Pinbacker, the self-proclaimed “Last Man”—embodies this dissonance in a monstrous form.  
Driven to insanity by the implications of his mission, Pinbacker abandons the mission and 
welcomes the opportunity to witness the end of humankind: “At the end of time, a moment 
will come when just one man remains...The last man, alone with God.”138 
Whereas in Shelley’s apocalyptic novel the protagonist Lionel Verney laments his fate as the 
lonely witness of humanity’s end, Boyle’s Last Man views himself as the completion of 
human history and the embodiment of a new evolutionary reality.  Psychologically 
disconnected from the rest of humankind, Pinbacker engages in a self-conscious process of 
physical mutation that transforms him into a kind of monster (for this reason critics often 
classify Sunshine as a horror film).  He effects this disturbing “evolution” by repeatedly 
exposing his naked body to unfiltered sunlight in the ship’s observation room.  This exposure 
to the sun progressively burns and blisters his skin, so that by the end of the film, his 
appearance is grotesquely alien rather than human.  Like the Creature in Frankenstein, 
Pinbacker disrupts normal existential categories, effectively functioning as a zombie as he 
stalks the other characters in an insane frenzy.  Moreover, his dramatic emergence in the final 
third of the film subverts the narrative’s established existential priorities (its privileging of 
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species over individual) and offers a perverse celebration of the Shelleyean Last Man rather 
than the mournful depiction found in Shelley’s novel.  
In its treatment of the question of God, Sunshine reinforces both a spiritual and a 
material perspective of existence.  A clearly biological perspective fuels the film’s central 
evolutionary concerns—extinction and species survival. Moreover, Boyle repeatedly includes 
references (both explicit and subtle) to the ephemeral and material aspects of existence. For 
example, Sunshine repeatedly references an oxygen garden maintained in one of the large 
rooms on board the Icarus II: for the astronauts, this greenhouse provides a reminder of 
Earth, and its plantlife symbolizes biological flourishing. Yet early in the film, an accident on 
board the ship requires the complete extermination of all the greenhouse plants by a 
controlled burn-out.  The crew responds to this development despondently because for them 
it signifies their own biological fragility and ephemerality. After the burn-out, a single tiny 
blade of grass inexplicably survives, a biological remnant that the crew treasures all the more 
for its symbolic power in the face of a powerful exterminating force.  Interestingly, one of the 
characters on the ship dies clutching this single blade of grass, metaphorically tying the 
biological vulnerability of humankind to the symbol of a tiny, fragile plant. 
However, while Sunshine’s narrative utilizes a materialist paradigm, it also evokes a 
distinctly spiritual tone, and its overall artistic goal is to provide a transcendental experience 
for the viewer.   In this Boyle diverges from Shelley’s Last Man;  the film’s cinematography 
emphasizes the sublimity of the sun in every scene, and the musical score renders the 
characters’ deaths as spiritual events rather than empty negations.  We see this pattern 
especially in the protagonist’s death at the end. He smiles as he is slowly consumed by the 
sun’s fire and the scene fades out in brilliant light, all the while accompanied by elevated, 
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new-age-like music.  Unlike the grotesqueries of Shelley’s novel, Boyle’s film presents death 
as the path to a sublime spirituality—leaving room for God at the narrative’s margins. Also 
the film’s move in the last third into a kind of psychedelic, hallucinatory experience 
(especially with scenes in the sun and the protagonist’s final moments on ship and unrealistic 
death that fulfills a dream and seems like a dream) moves it from the literal and tangible to 
something more subjective and more dreamlike—gesturing toward a spiritual dimension of 
mind disconnected from mere matter.  Shelley’s novel lacks this.139 
Both The Last Man and Sunshine employ narrative rupture, a device that further 
destabilizes categories of life/death, mind/body, spirit/matter, and biology/technology. As I 
discussed in the earlier chapter with reference to The Last Man, the term narrative rupture 
denotes an abrupt change in a narrative that results from the tensions between theoretical 
categories symbolized by the slice, disrupting the ways in which ontological binaries 
function in the larger narrative structure. Because such ruptures are so disruptive to the larger 
narratives, some critics view them as evidence of an authorial/directorial deficiency—an 
inattention to required generic conventions or an inability to sustain a plotline consistently to 
an appropriate conclusion.  A number of film critics have found fault with this aspect of 
Sunshine. Derek Elhy writes, “Like a collapsing star, Sunshine initially burns brightly but 
finally implodes into a dramatic black hole.”140 Expressing a similar sentiment, Claudia Pulg 
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140 Derek Elhy, “Movie Review: Danny Boyle’s Sunshine,” Variety (April 3, 2007). 
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argues that “as the film ultimately deviates from its course, the entire undertaking suffers.”141 
However, I would argue that such critiques fail to appreciate Sunshine’s narrative rupture as 
meaningful rather than haphazard.   
We saw earlier that the apparent rupture in The Last Man actually serves to dramatize 
key ontological tensions.  A similar dynamic underlies the plot of Sunshine when it abruptly 
introduces the monstrous character of Captain Pinbacker, a self-proclaimed “Last Man” who 
led an earlier failed mission and was driven to insanity while stranded alone for seven years 
on a spaceship orbiting the sun.  At the core of Pinbacker’s madness is a conviction that God 
desires the end of the human species and has designated Pinbacker to be the sole witness to 
its end.  With a Nietszchean arrogance, Pinbacker envisions himself as the embodiment of 
the next phase in human evolution and thus not only the Last Man but a kind of cosmic First 
Man—a motif reminiscent of the Space Baby born at the end of Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A 
Space Odyssey.142  Accompanying Pinbacker’s delusion is his obsession with the sun, which 
he regards as the physical manifestation of God.  As a demonic figure, Boyle’s Last Man 
destabilizes the film’s narrative, attacking the other characters and sabotaging their mission. 
His late emergence marks the film’s sudden transition from the conventions of science fiction 
to those of horror. This eruption of the Real upsets the narrative’s symbolic ordering of 
existential categories.  Whereas the film clearly prioritizes the life of the species over the 
individual astronauts (MANY/few, SPECIES/individual), Pinbacker welcomes humankind’s 
extinction and desires to be its sole survivor.  His attempts to sabotage the astronauts’ 
mission threaten the film’s theme of technological salvation and suggests a tension within the 
                                                 
141 Claudia Pulg, “Into the Sun: Danny Boyle’s Sunshine,” USA Today (July 20, 2007). 
 
142 Stanley Kubrick, 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968: Los Angeles: MGM), DVD: Warner 
Brothers, 1998.  
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binary nature/technology, insomuch as technological intervention opposes the natural course 
of events (the death of the Sun and the consequent extinction of humankind).   
Unlike The Last Man where the rupturing forces remain in control, Sunshine 
concludes with its pre-rupture priorities: the individual sacrifices of the protagonists’ lives 
ensures the survival of the species, and the Last Man’s deranged objectives are thwarted. 
Though the ship’s crew face the inevitable end of their individual lives on this suicide 
mission, the salvation of the species provides a larger optimistic premise to the film.  In 
depicting the survival of the human species at the expense of protagonists’ death, Sunshine 
shifts its focus from a simple life/death dichotomy to one that opposes the survival of many 
to the survival of the few.  This formulation presenting the protagonists’ death as a necessary, 
noble sacrifice for the human race thus employs a value system that is recognizably 
utilitarian (MANY/few) and evolutionary (SPECIES/individual), in which the needs of the 
larger group (humanity) take precedence over the needs of individuals. Because the film ends 
with the detonation of the solar bomb and the mission’s success, the larger narrative 
overcomes Pinbacker’s interference, but the sudden disruption of the plot by this insane, 
monstrous character clearly functions as an eruption of the Real, which by definition is 
always unpredictable, irrational, and horrific.  
In addition to his horror films, Boyle also recently directed a theatrical version of 
Frankenstein written by Nick Dear, which premiered at the Royal National Theater in 
London in 2011 and received numerous awards.  Boyle’s production generated such popular 
interest that a recording of it was recently screened at cinemas in Great Britain and America.  
Praised for its explicit exploration of various subtexts implicit in the original novel, Boyle’s 
version foregrounds graphic sexuality and violence and employs a recurrent technological 
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motif that emphasizes more profoundly the anxiety about technology suggested by Shelley’s 
novel.  What is of greatest significance to this essay are the ways in which Boyle’s 
production explores specific anxieties about the tensions within several related existential 
categories: life/death, mind/body, spirit/matter, and biology/technology.  Like Shelley’s 
novel, Boyle’s play calls attention to the paradoxes inherent in these antinomies—the ways in 
which such distinct categories nevertheless seem to bleed into each other throughout the 
narrative.  In fact, Boyle’s production extends further than Shelley’s novel in emphasizing 
the tensions inherent in such dichotomies. 
Boyle’s play greatly accentuates the grotesque dimensions of Shelley’s narrative and 
engenders in the audience a more pronounced sense of the novel’s materialist perspective.  In 
continually evoking a strong feeling of repulsion at biological processes of reproduction and 
death, the play underlines the novel’s focus on certain aspects of two existential dichotomies: 
life/death and spirit/matter.  One way in which Boyle emphasizes materiality is by opening 
his play with a rather grotesque depiction of the Creature’s birth.  The play begins with a 
kind of large, red amniotic sack out of which the Creature bursts with great effort and the 
expulsion of fluid.  The color red—indicative of blood—is prominent in the play in nearly 
every scene, especially the very explicit portrayal of Victor slicing up the body of the female 
mate he has just created for the creature.  The emphasis on the color red and the frequent 
inclusion of bloody, graphic biological depictions heightens the play’s focus on the 
disturbing, material dimensions of existence and decay. 
Despite this material emphasis, Boyle also supplies theological exchanges between 
the Creature and Victor that are absent in Shelley’s novel. In this way, Boyle’s version makes 
Frankenstein a more defined exploration of humanity’s relationship to God than Shelley’s 
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novel allows, and the audience consequently engages in a much more consistently self-
referential experience. For example, the Creature engages in very extensive discussions about 
the relevance of John Milton’s Paradise Lost to his own life, discussions that go far beyond 
the allusions Shelley provides in her novel. Moreover, a significant moment occurs when 
Boyle’s Creature and Victor shake hands to seal Victor’s agreement to create a female 
creature.  After sealing their agreement with this customary gesture, Victor withdraws his 
hand in a deliberately slow, highly emphasized movement that clearly alludes to the famous 
depiction of the hands of Adam and God painted on the Sistine Chapel.  This movement, 
performed in such silence and slow motion that it is impossible not to recognize the 
reference, reinforces the play’s evocation of disturbing theological questions. 
In emphasizing the grotesque materiality of existence while also making explicit 
references to the most troubling of theological questions, Boyle’s play deepens the tension 
between spirit and matter.  It offers no hope or explanation of a spiritual dimension to 
existence in its relentless focus on the material aspects of reproduction and death, and yet at 
the same time its explicit depiction of recognizable theological questions and more direct 
comparisons to humanity’s spiritual frustrations refuse to cross out the spiritual aspect of the 
spirit/matter dichotomy and instead deepen the compelling nature of its demands.  In effect, 
Boyle’s play more strongly highlights the theoretical paradoxes within the spirit/matter 
binary.  
It is also important to note the use of narrative foreclosure and eruption in both 
Shelley’s and Boyle’s versions of Frankenstein.  In Mary Shelley’s novel, as we saw in an 
earlier chapter, Victor’s abandonment of religion in favor of materialism and of natural 
processes for technological ones place him on one side of the existential slice 
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(MATTER/spirit and TECHNOLOGY/nature); his repression of the spiritual and natural sets 
the stage for the return of the repressed and the destabilization of these existential binaries.  
The resulting eruption of the Real assumes the form of the Creature’s murderous revenge.  
The consequence of Victor’s total disregard for spiritual or religious objections emerges as 
the Creature assumes a posture toward the end of the novel that is distinctly demonic (in fact, 
Victor explicitly refers to him as a demon).  While the Creature initially displays a capacity 
for benevolence, Victor’s refusal to acknowledge his responsibility as Creator or to view the 
Creature outside the limitations of a materialist perspective serves as the catalyst for the 
Creature’s rapid transformation into an evil, almost-satanic figure. This depiction of the 
Creature as an evil demon is a perverse reference to the religious element excluded by 
Victor’s rationalist and materialist perspective.  Because religion is foreclosed in Victor’s 
intellectual system, it emerges in a perverse form later in the narrative as a kind of violent 
eruption of the Real. Additionally, Victor’s disregard for nature and his abdication of a 
traditional reproductive/domestic function with Elizabeth makes the murder of Elizabeth on 
his wedding night an ironic consequence of his earlier symbolic foreclosure: in essence, 
Victor’s disregard for nature’s reproductive power means that he must suffer its destructive 
power (violence/murder) as the eruption of the Real. 
 Boyle’s stage production of Frankenstein provides a more pronounced depiction of 
this theoretical perspective.  The play’s stylistic emphasis on the uneasy dichotomy of nature 
and technology (discussed earlier in this essay) and its more explicit renderings of a number 
of sexual and reproductive motifs to which Shelley’s novel only obliquely alludes allow the 
viewer a better understanding of the relationship between Victor’s failures and their violent 
consequences.  The play’s clearest depiction of this dynamic occurs in Boyle’s rendering of 
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the wedding-night scene in which the Creature rapes and murders Elizabeth on the very bed 
into which she has been trying to coax Victor. While disturbing, Boyle’s addition of the rape 
of Elizabeth not only fills in a lacuna in Shelley’s narrative but more importantly makes a 
direct metaphorical connection between Victor’s avoidance of his natural reproductive role 
and the subsequent violent eruption of sexuality in the perverse form of a rape. (The violation 
of Elizabeth also “answers” Victor’s refusal to provide a wife and a sexual/reproductive 
mechanism for the Creature.) In effect, Boyle’s version of Shelley’s narrative more strongly 
emphasizes the consequences of Victor’s privileging of technological vs. natural 
reproduction.  
The types of violent eruptions within categorical systems that I have discussed here 
are not limited to science fiction and horror genres; such dynamics also occur in political 
histories, both real and fictional.  In particular, this metaphor of eruption is integral to 
understanding certain popular narratives about the French Revolution, especially in the sharp 
juxtapositions evoked in the British imagination by reports—real and fictional—from France 
at the time.  Although this period no doubt posed a legitimate danger to a number of 
individuals in France at the time, exaggerated and entirely fictional atrocities were frequently 
reported in Britain, and the events of the Terror acquired a compelling, grotesque mystique 
that soon attached itself permanently to the guillotine. As the primary symbol of its historical 
moment, the guillotine was overlaid with the various antinomies generated by the revolution, 
and its association with Enlightenment-era perspectives as well as political terror transformed 
it into a locus for the various contradictions inherent in modernity.   
The mystique surrounding this eruption of the Real also helps us to understand the 
popularity of sensational—and entirely fictional—cannibal narratives that circulated in 
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various official and unofficial British reports at the time concerning events in France.  Like 
the rabid zombies in 28 Days Later, the murderous Creature in Frankenstein, or the plague in 
The Last Man, the French cannibals in British narratives of the Terror embodied the Real in 
its most extreme, disturbing form—rendering the French as grotesque monsters.  
   The eruption of the Real as a reaction to the official enlightened, humane goals of the 
revolution also suggests a reason for the popularity of the Gothic during this historical 
period, as such literature depicts the violence and irrationality of the Real in various narrative 
forms.  This dynamic also accounts for the widespread appeal of horror films in our own 
current “civilized” historical moment.  Wherever society seeks to exclude undesired elements 
or problematic categories from the symbolic order, such elements often find ways—political, 
cultural, or artistic—through which to erupt and destabilize official systems of classification 
and control. 
 
Frank Darabont’s Reimagining of the Frankenstein Narrative in Mary Shelley’s 
Frankenstein and the The Walking Dead 
Because the Frankenstein narrative evokes many of the same anxieties that underlie 
zombie films, Danny Boyle is not the only filmmaker with an overlapping interest in both 
Shelley’s novel and zombie narratives.  AMC’s apocalyptic television drama The Walking 
Dead has become, arguably, the most recognized and popular iteration of the zombie 
narrative since George Romero’s Night of the Living Dead.  As with other zombie films,   
The Walking Dead questions the boundaries between existential categories of life/death, 
spirit/matter, and mind/body—exposing the metaphorical slices within these dichotomies and 
the troubling paradoxes they entail.   Like Frankenstein’s Creature and the zombies in 
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Boyle’s film, the zombies of The Walking Dead exist in an indeterminate space between 
existential categories. But if Darabont’s zombie narrative closely correlates with earlier 
zombie films in many ways, it is distinct in its explicit emphasis on pregnancy and childbirth. 
Of course, I have already noted that reproduction is an important source of anxiety 
underlying the zombie genre.  My point here, however, is that very few zombie films 
explicitly feature human, rather than zombie, reproduction and incorporate pregnancy and 
childbirth-related subplots. To my knowledge, Darabont’s The Walking Dead is the first and 
only popular zombie narrative in which human reproduction itself is an integral, repeated 
motif—one that often shifts the show’s focus away from the zombies.    
I have already suggested that Frankenstein is the implicit ancestor of the modern 
zombie genre, but The Walking Dead’s emphasis on reproduction offers an additional 
thematic link to Shelley’s novel. However, The Walking Dead and Frankenstein share a more 
direct connection: before he created the popular zombie show, Frank Darabont was the 
primary screenwriter for Kenneth Branagh’s cinematic version of Frankenstein, the first 
attempt at a serious, sophisticated film adaptation of the classic literary work.  Darabont’s 
screenplay for Branagh’s film reflects his profound interest in the ontological and 
reproductive themes he would later explore in The Walking Dead.  (Most works in 
Darabont’s oeuvre, in fact, share these same preoccupations.)143 When considering the 
influence of Shelley’s novel on the modern sci-fi/horror zombie genre, Darabont’s work 
creative involvement in M.S.’s Frankenstein and The Walking Dead supports my 
understanding of the zombie as an artistic descendent of Frankenstein’s Creature and the 
modern incarnation of the same anxieties that generated Shelley’s novel almost two hundred 
                                                 
143 Especially Trancers (Los Angeles: Empire Pictures: 1995), The Fly 2 (Los Angeles: 20th 
Century Fox: 1989), and The Mist (Los Angeles: MGM: 2007).    
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years ago.  It is helpful, then, to examine Darabont’s screenplay for M.S.’s Frankenstein 
before discussing his subsequent zombie series.   
Branagh and Darabont’s adaptation of Frankenstein was generally poorly received by 
film critiques and popular audiences alike.  Of course, a film’s reception is not necessarily an 
indication of its artistic value, but such a critical and commercial failure does require an 
explanation.  Most criticism of the film focused on Branagh’s direction: “tonally 
inconsistent,” “over-the-top,” “melodramatic,” “overwrought,” and even “campy.”  Also, a 
number of critics disliked Robert De Niro’s portrayal of the Creature, viewing his 
performance as garish, lacking nuance, and even unintentionally comical.  Such flaws 
seemed especially apparent because of their contrast with the film’s artistic aspirations—its 
Shakspearean director, esteemed actors, and its determination to remain faithful to certain 
elements of Shelley’s text that slowed the momentum of the main plot.    
From the perspective of a film critique or a typical movie-goer, such critiques are 
valid. However, it is unfortunate that the failure of Branagh’s film obscured the merits of 
Darabont’s screenplay, which interprets Shelley’s novel in ways that are deeply insightful 
and expand rather than reduce her original narrative.  The best example of this deepening is 
Darabont’s treatment of Victor’s motivation for his experiments.  In addition to  intellectual 
ambition, Darabont suggests another reason for Victor’s interest in artificial 
regeneration/reproduction:  the death of his mother in childbirth—an element absent in 
Shelley’s narrative.  In an early scene, Victor’s mother suffers through an agonizing, 
unsuccessful attempt at labor.  Branagh’s direction renders this scene especially horrific, with 
a graphic depiction of Victor’s mother drenched in blood as she screams repeatedly.  
Darabont makes this traumatic experience the catalyst for Victor’s decision to pursue his 
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research.  Moments after his mother dies, Victor resolves that he will pursue a remedy for 
death: “Mother, you should never have died.  No one need ever die. I will stop this.  I will 
stop this!”  It is only at this point in the film that Victor begins his research. 
One could argue that such a change to Shelley’s story dilutes the novel’s implication 
of Victor’s ambition as his fatal flaw, the fundamental cause of his unethical experiment.  
While this may be true, Darabont’s narrative addition is interesting in its explicit 
juxtaposition of life and death (in which birth literally causes death).  This juxtaposition 
emphasizes the narrative’s anxieties about reproduction, and it reinforces Victor’s 
preoccupation with the paradoxical relationship between life and death processes, a theme 
referenced in Shelley’s text when Victor explains the rationale for his research 
methodology.144 
 Another way in which Darabont’s screenplay adds to Shelley’s novel is by 
emphasizing the plague that occurs while Victor is at Ingolstadt.  Darabont accords the 
plague an important status not only as a major plotpoint but also as a motif of physical decay.  
Several scenes in the film depict grotesque corpses piled high and transported from the city, 
along with images of those diseased but still alive, often moaning and collapse in the streets.  
Darabont’s screenplay also has Victor soliloquize about the plague in interior monologues 
and letters:  for Victor, the plague is one more indication of inevitable biological decay, and 
it symbolizes in his mind the inextricable relationship between life and death processes—
reinforcing his belief that in order to understand the secrets to generating life, one must study 
death. 
                                                 
144 See my earlier chapter on Frankenstein. 
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 Shifting our focus from Darabont’s Frankenstein screenplay to his most recent work, 
the popular television series The Walking Dead, we see an emphasis on similar themes.  
Darabont created The Walking Dead in 2010; based on a popular comic book, the television 
show began airing on the cable channel AMC in 2011, and quickly became a pop cultural 
phenomenon.  In fact, its current third season is the highest-rated program on cable tv.  As 
with George Romero’s Night of the Living Dead and Danny Boyle’s 28 Days Later, The 
Walking Dead depicts a group of strangers brought together as they struggle for survival 
against hordes of zombies.  The Walking Dead most closely mirrors Boyle’s film—and in 
fact likely drew inspiration from it—with a central protagonist named Rick Grimes who 
awakens from a coma to find the world he once knew now shattered.  As with Boyle’s film, 
The Walking Dead depicts fast-moving, rabid zombies—products of a government-created 
disease gone awry—who can only be killed by destroying the brain. Decapitated heads are, in 
fact, a key repeated motif in the tv series. Also, as in Boyle’s earlier film, Darabont presents 
a post-apocalyptic society lacking the mechanisms of government and technology essential 
for maintaining order. 
 However, despite its adherence to the basic plot elements of modern zombie films, 
The Walking Dead incorporates reproductive themes as a foundational element of its 
narrative.  Its preoccupation with human reproduction separates it from the other works in the 
zombie genre, which focus exclusively on zombie reproduction (the transmission of the 
zombie virus).145  In fact, Darabont’s series foregrounds issues of human reproduction to 
such an extent that they often overshadow the primary zombie plotline.   
                                                 
145 There are a few exceptions to this rule within the zombie genre, but even these rare 
exceptions only briefly reference human reproduction in an ancillary fashion.  To my 
knowledge, the only other zombie work besides The Walking Dead that includes human 
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 The Walking Dead early on allows its protagonist Rick Grimes to discover that his 
wife Lori is pregnant, possibly by another man.   Over the course of the first season, this 
question of paternity develops into a significant problem for the central characters, disrupting 
their small community and creating dangerous divisions within it.  Beyond this theme of 
uncertain paternity, the series also uses this pregnancy as way to underscore the 
vulnerability of biological life: in a world infested with the walking dead, a pregnancy is 
especially dangerous and a mother and infant find themselves especially suseptible to attack.  
Such a prominent narrative linking between reproduction and death foregrounds the 
ontological dichotomy that is the focus of this essay—a dichotomy that, I would argue, is 
central to the zombie genre itself.  
 Also interesting to me is the fact that Lori Grimes’s ambivalence about her pregnancy 
allows Darabont’s show to explore questions about the ontological status of a fetus.  Just as 
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein placed the Creature in an indeterminate position similar to a 
fetus (as I explained in an earlier chapter), The Walking Dead emphasizes this indeterminacy 
throughout its narrative.  After Lori realizes she is pregnant, she ingests several “morning-
after” pills in an attempt to abort the several-weeks-old fetus within her.146  She quickly 
regrets this action and vomits the pills, yet her husband Rick discovers her attempt and 
angrily chastises her for it, claiming that the hope of a new child is one of his few 
motivations to continue living in a post-apocalyptic world.  In censuring his wife, Rick 
accuses her of attempting to “murder the baby,” clearly asserting the status of the fetus as a 
                                                                                                                                                       
pregnancy and birth as a major plot element is the 2004 remake of Dawn of the Dead, in 
which a pregnant woman becomes a zombie and is tied to a bed and forced to give birth to a 
zombie infant by her grief-stricken, delusional husband.  
 
146 Her attempt is misguided because emergency contraception does not cause an abortion.  
  
105
full human whose death would be morally equivalent to homicide.  Lori’s ultimate 
unwillingness to abort the fetus further reinforces this notion of the fetus as a legitimate 
human life.   
Given The Walking Dead’s interest in ontological questions related to reproduction 
and maternity, it is no surprise that the show’s writers finally terminated Lori by means of a 
primitive, makeshift Caesarean section.  Lori’s death—depicted explicitly, even  
including a close-up of the knife’s incision into her stomach—constituted perhaps the most 
wrenching plot twist for viewers of the show so far.  Interestingly, the death of Lori in 
exchange for the life or her baby evokes the very same types of ontological questions we find 
in Frankenstein and a number of other Gothic novels from the Romantic period.  It is this 
concern with the tensions between ontological categories that accounts in part for the 
popularity of the varied narratives and genres I have explored in this essay.  
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Conclusion 
Assessments of Mary Shelley’s novel Frankenstein commonly refer to it as a seminal 
work of proto-science-fiction, a narrative that not only captured certain modern ideas of its 
time but also prophesied the anxieties that would emerge fully almost two centuries later in 
response to accelerating technological and scientific developments. Additionally, 
Frankenstein is also widely credited as the progenitor of a set of modern fiction genres—
tech-horror and the mad-scientist narrative, for example—tremendously popular in literature 
and media today. However, despite the nearly ubiquitous recognition of Frankenstein’s 
influence on modern popular culture, there are few comparative studies of Shelley’s novel 
and its derivatives among popular modern films (for instance, James Whale’s film and the 
numerous later adaptations of the novel).  Moreover, Frankenstein’s influence on modern 
film has been underestimated; that is, its influence extends to more cinematic genres and 
works than the limited examples for which it has been credited.   
In this dissertation, I have moved beyond analyses of Frankenstein’s obvious 
derivatives to study films which fuse her novel’s motifs with appeals to twentieth-century 
and post-millenium audiences.  These films belong to several popular genres including bio-
horror, tech-horror, reproductive horror, apocalyptic sci-fi, and the zombie film; they 
emphasize the particular anxieties explored in Frankenstein and employ similar themes and 
motifs.  
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 In considering the legacy of Frankenstein, I have examined the mythology 
surrounding its creation—a mythology fostered by Shelley in her 1831 introduction to the 
novel, first published in 1818, wherein she discusses the conditions under which she 
conceived it, especially her colorful anecdote concerning the informal writing contest of 
1816 among herself, Percy Shelley, Lord Byron, and John Polidori. Scholarship has tended to 
take Mary Shelley at her word about the novel’s origins in a contest and a nightmare. 
Frankenstein is thus often understood as the result of a fortuitous spark that generated a 
mysterious creative outflowing from deep within the writer’s psyche.  
Instead, my analysis has emphasized the historical context that produced Shelley’s 
narrative, specifically the constitutive influence of three particular historical developments of 
the Romantic period:  (1.) the violence of the French Revolution, especially the Terror and 
the ten years preceeding Napoleon’s 1799 ascendancy; (2.) the intrusion of modern 
technology into life and death processes like execution and childbirth, especially the 
introduction of guillotine execution and the concomitant rise of modern obstetrics in the late 
eighteeenth century; (3.) and the emergence of materialist theories in science and medicine, 
which inspired various sensationalized experiments such as those performed on the corpses 
of the guillotined.  
Due to the guillotine’s significance as a symbol for all three historical 
developments—the French Revolution, the emergence of modern technology, and the rise of 
materialist science—I have employed it in my analysis as a metaphorical paradigm for 
interpreting the Frankenstein narrative. The guillotine was a powerful signifier in the British 
Romantic imagination because of its status as both a symbol and a symptom of the period’s 
historical anxieties. I have also argued for the guillotine’s relevance for Frankenstein due to 
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my view that the character of Victor Frankenstein is a narrative displacement of Giovanni 
Aldini, widely perceived at the time as the prototypical “mad-scientist” due to his notorious 
experiments, which used guillotined corpses to test the materialist scientific theories of his 
uncle, Luigi Galvani.  Scholars’ long acceptance of the ghost-story myth, rather than of the 
guillotine as the defining context for Frankenstein, has led to a distorted assessment of 
Shelley’s novel. Scholars often acknowledge Galvani as an important source for 
Frankenstein but neglect to credit his nephew and successor Giovanni Aldini, whose 
notoriety was tied to the guillotine and who was better known to the British public than his 
uncle, in part because he was fluent in English and French. Aldini travelled throughout 
Europe conducting sensationalistic public experiments on executed corpses—for instance, at 
the London execution of the notorious murderer George Foster at Newgate in 1803—
experiments that were covered in British newspapers along with their underlying theory, 
galvanism. Aldini first achieved notoriety during the French Revolution for frequenting 
guillotine executions and conducting experiments on the severed heads of the condemned,  
“testing” the heads post-execution for facial expressions and other signs of residual life and 
then re-animating them with electricity.  Like Victor Frankenstein’s use of corpses for 
scientific research in Mary Shelley’s novel, Aldini searched for the key to life in his 
experiments on corpses.  In fact, guillotine execution attained a distinctive mystique in the 
popular Romantic imagination partly due to Aldini’s famous experiments. 
  Aldini preferred to utilize corpses who had suffered guillotine execution because of 
its mechanized precision: there was a clarity to the guillotine in that it reduced the act of 
execution to a single moment, a sudden shift from life to death. Rather than a more extended 
process in which the instant of death was difficult to discern (as with a hanging, for 
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example), the guillotine presented death as a distinct, mechanized switch-point from 
animation to lifelessness.  This aspect of guillotine execution accorded with galvanism’s 
notion that life might be generated or halted abruptly with the application or withdrawal of a 
single electrical charge.  Conversely, popular reports of severed heads exhibiting expressions 
post-guillotining implied that some residual force or “charge” might exist for a time after the 
execution. For Aldini, guillotine execution reinforced galvanic notions about life and death 
processes.  His experiments with guillotined corpses supported a materialist view of 
existence, according to which life is merely the animation of biological material by 
exclusively physical—rather than spiritual—processes.  
By recognizing Aldini’s role in Frankenstein, I have demonstrated how Shelley’s 
novel activates associations with the guillotine specifically, not just with the widely 
acknowledged context of the French Revolution: Frankenstein evinces the very anxieties and 
tensions symbolized by the guillotine. I have also argued that viewing Victor as a 
displacement of Aldini allows for a reading of Frankenstein with reference to the guillotine 
and offers interesting new ways of interpreting Shelley’s novel.  
 I have also incorporated the perspectives of scholars such as Michel Foucault, who 
viewed the Enlightenment as an attempt to regulate and instrumentalize “natural” impulses, 
forcing human drives and behaviors to operate within the confines of a “disciplinary 
society.”147 Similarly, Max Horkheimer and Theodore Adorno identified in modernity a 
perversion of human society into something reductively mechanized and materialist. 
In addition, I have examined the various ontological questions symbolized by the 
guillotine.  Its designers regarded the replacement of the human executioner by a machine as 
                                                 
147 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage, 
1975), p. 105.  
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a humane improvement, but insomuch as this depersonalization focused on the act of death 
itself, a distinct moment of termination via the severing of head and body.  Yet paradoxically, 
strange facial expressions and contortions often appeared on the severed heads after 
decapitation, implying the possible continuation of consciousness and provoking a sense of 
ontological indeterminacy.  Furthermore, the image of a severed head not only questioned 
where life ended and where it began, but also pointed to the disagreement between Cartesian 
and materialist paradigms of identity.  According to the Cartesian model, the locus of identity 
is the mind distinct from the material body.  This concept of a mind/body split also accords 
with traditional religious notions of identity as primarily spiritual rather than physical.  
Opposing this distinction between the mind and the body, modern materialism conversely 
understands the “mind” as a purely physical phenomenon (the brain) and refuses to relegate 
the body to an ontologically inferior category as Cartesian and traditional Christian 
perspectives do.  This fundamental disagreement about human subjectivity is the source of 
the contradictions expressed by Slavoj !i"ek and various other scholars, as I have discussed.  
Thus, the guillotine embodies a set of ontological paradoxes generated by the modernity.    
 Given that the guillotine can be read as symtom and signifier of modern historical 
anxieties, I have employed it as a kind of clue signalling a labyrinth of meanings embedded 
in Romantic literature and certain modern films. I have also analyzed the significance of the 
slice itself—the uneasy, indeterminate line that simultaneously separates and joins 
ontological categories such as life/death, mind/body, spirit/matter, and nature/technology.   
This hitherto understudied aspect of guillotine lore—the slice—has been neglected by 
scholars but, I have argued, is a distinctively useful metaphor for uncomfortable 
juxtapositions and indeterminacies of modernity, providing new ways of interpreting 
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Romantic texts such as Frankenstein and countering conventional assumptions about 
Romantic organicism. That is, I have argued that using the guillotine slice as an interpretive 
paradigm helps us to identify juxtapositions in Romantic texts and recognize a kind of 
asyndeton as a key constitutive feature of Romanticism itself. 
It is common in Romantic literary criticism to note the importance of both idealism 
and disappointment in Romantic attitudes.  In particular, the outcome of the French 
Revolution--its quick devolution from the bright dawning of a newly enlightened age to 
gruesome violence--elicited passionate and often discordant attitudes from many Romantic 
writers.  Wordsworth's Prelude, for instance, reflects both the unfettered enthusiasm of his 
more youthful years in France as well as his later dismay over the violence of the Terror. 
Because many Romantic writers believed that democracy offered a vastly superior system to 
France's ancien regime, they tended to support the Revolution there as the heralding of 
positive change in history.  A number of them, like Wordsworth, spent time in France prior 
to or even during the Revolution, attempting to absorb by osmosis the exciting spirit of that 
time and place.  Those British writers of the period who did not live in France still had access 
to events there via letters from friends abroad, as well as frequent reports in periodicals like 
London's The Times.  Some of the most compelling reports of the period appear in the letters 
of writers who provide intriguing "you-are-there" accounts of the Revolution. A number of 
critics have analyzed the theme of Romantic disappointment--it is a constitutive feature of 
much Wordsworthian criticism.  However, I have argued in this dissertation that the scope of 
this disappointment must be better understood against the background of such intensely felt 
initial hope (and even euphoria) in expectation of an enlightened, democratic political 
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Revolution.  It is this stark contrast—this cognitive dissonance—that accounts for the 
thematic preoccupations of many Romantic works. 
In examining Mary Shelley’s science fiction novels, I have focused on the metaphor 
of the slice in analyzing the tensions within ontological binaries of life/death, mind/body, 
spirit/matter, nature/tech that I have argued underlie Frankenstein and The Last Man, her 
lesser-known apocalyptic novel. These works emphasize ontological categories contested by 
modernity, exploring modernity’s simultaneous blurring and sharpening of the theoretical 
slices that simultaneously separate and join oppositional categories. Shelley’s novels merge 
categories of life and death through repeated descriptions of their protagonists as barely alive 
or death-like, but they also frequently emphasize the sharp discordance between life and 
death. We see this paradox in the Frankenstein narrative, which classifies the Creature as 
alive but inhuman and repeatedly describes Victor in terms suggestive of death. In the same 
way, The Last Man’s hero, Lionel Verney, the witness of a worldwide plague who constantly 
anticipates his own imminent death, often perceives himself as existing uncomfortably 
between existential states, with the specter of death intruding uncomfortably into life. We can 
also see this paradox functioning in John Polidori’s The Vampyre, which, with its invention 
of the undead aristocrat, originated the now ubitquitous vampire of modern cinema as an 
elegant figure who preyes on the living and gains eternal life through the death of his victims. 
This descriptive collapsing of the line between existence and death suggests the same 
preoccupation with boundaries underlying popular discussions of the guillotine in the 
Romantic period—in which the sharp juxtapositions or slices of guillotine execution were 
symbolically symptomatic of unresolved paradoxes inherent in modern ontological 
categories.  
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I have also analyzed how Mary Shelley’s The Last Man expands on many of the 
ontological anxieties underlying Frankenstein. Like Shelley’s earlier “modern” novel, The 
Last Man articulates an anxiety about the tension between antonymic categories life/death, 
spirit/matter, mind/body, and nature/technology—or nature/civilization, to put it another 
way.  This last binary is often expressed in fiction and film as an apocalyptic narrative, one in 
which civilization disintegrates and humanity nears extinction. As apocalypse is a prominent 
topic in a number of twentieth-century and post-millenium films, I have contended that the 
thematic influence of The Last Man has been underestimated and that its evocation of 
ontological anxieties and apocalyptic themes make it—like Frankenstein—a kind of literary 
ancestor to a number of later science fiction and horror films.  For this reason, I have argued 
that The Last Man deserves greater critical attention. 
My analysis has also broadened to Frankenstein’s wider, unnamed influence on films 
recognizably symptomatic of the same modern anxieties that produced her classic narrative. 
For example, one of the basic conventions of the modern zombie genre—including the first 
and best-known zombie film, George Romero’s Night of the Living Dead—is that killing a 
zombie requires inflicting a fatal injury to its head. Modern scholarship on zombie films 
commonly notes the ubiquity of this imperative to destroy the zombie brain (rather than, say, 
the heart). Significantly, this convention confines the locus of existence to the head and 
suggests a categorical and existential split between the head (or mind) and the body. In 
utilizing this motif of the slice, zombie films draw more deeply upon the same kinds of 
anxieties elicited by guillotine execution—the sense that existence is localized in the mind 
and, moreover, that the mind is somehow categorically and existentially distinct from the 
body. In their exploration of such ontological anxieties, zombie films like Night of the Living 
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Dead and 28 Days Later echo thematic preoccupations of Frankenstein and The Last Man. 
Moreover, zombie films lack much suggestion of any non-material, spiritual existence, 
implying the materialist view that identity and behavior are entirely biologically determined.  
 This fundamental disagreement about human subjectivity is the source of the 
contradictions explored by the classic novels of Mary Shelley as well as numerous modern 
science fiction and horror films.  It is these ontological paradoxes generated by modernity 
and symbolized by the guillotine that, I have argued, provide us with an important way of 
understanding Romanticism, modern horror cinema, and modernity itself.  
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